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Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Are Public
Accounting Firms Subject to Diverging Standards
of Conduct between Federal Courts and the
PCAOB in Securities Fraud Claims?

In Tellabs v. Makor,1 the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Section 404(b) certification by a public accounting firm, in
combination with other evidence, impacts the likelihood of a judicial finding of a
“strong inference of scienter” required by the PSLRA to survive a pre-trial motion to
dismiss a securities fraud claim against the public accounting firm.
“Sarbanes-Oxley costs the American people money. It costs jobs. It costs our
competitiveness. It hurts our markets.”2

“The dirty little secret is that many CFOs love [Section] 404.”3
“[A]ccounting firms simply cannot withstand an indictment. Can anyone
say ‘The Big Three?’”4
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Robert Schroeder, Group Sues over Governance Law: Challenge Mounted to Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
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Journal of Business & Technology Law

229

CIRIC (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002 (the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”) became law on July 30, 20025 following a
wave of corporate scandals at large corporations like Enron, Worldcom, Cendant,
or Bristol-Myers Squibb,6 the controversy surrounding the so-called “section 404”7
has been one of the most debated and argued provisions of the new law. Supporters
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, mostly investor groups and the plaintiffs bar, battle
representatives of the business community who support the loosening of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act or a wider deregulation in the field of federal securities law.8
Arguments on either side of the securities market regulation debate involve
enormous financial stakes and critical policy questions: skyrocketing compliance
costs, crippling regulation, a lack of competitiveness of the U.S. vis-à-vis other
exchanges on the one side,9 compete with the need for corporate accountability and
for transparency to ensure proper valuation of securities.10 At the center of the
debate, a “perfect storm” is forming around the public accounting firm,11 which is
statutorily entrusted to issue binding opinions on the truthfulness of the financial

5.
See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
6.
See Top Ten Settlements Post-Reform Act Securities Class Action Settlements, STANFORD LAW SCH. SEC.
CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/top-ten.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); Kathleen
F. Brickley, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 357,
359–60 (2003) (describing the accounting issues appearing with both the Enron and Worldcom scandals and
their impact on the development of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); Matthew S. Mokwa, Enron, SarbanesOxley, and the End of Earnings Management, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 325, 326 (2003) (describing the corporate practice
of earnings management that has led to several accounting failures); Duke Helfand & Marc Lifsher, California
Lawsuit Accuses Bristol-Myers Squibb of Fraud, Kickbacks, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com
/2011/mar/19/business/la-fi-drug-kickbacks-20110319.
7.
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
8.
See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION 7 (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf
(recommending that the SEC loosen capital controls for foreign issuers).
9.
See Neal L. Wolkoff, Sarbanes-Oxley Is a Curse for Small-Cap Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at
A13; Adriana Zea, Sarbanes-Oxley to Create Litigation Nightmare, ACCOUNTANCYAGE (Aug. 22, 2002),
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1764223/sarbanes-oxley-create-litigation-nightmare;
C.
Koch,
Compliance- The Sarbanes-Oxley Conspiracy, CIO (July 1, 2004), http://www.cio.com/article/29187/
Compliance_The_Sarbanes_Oxley_Sarbox_Conspiracy; Steve Forbes, Fact and Comment (Dump This
Destructive Deadweight), FORBES.COM (Aug. 18, 2005, 6:00 PM), www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0905/031.html.
10.
See K. Alvarado, Private Companies Embrace Sarbanes-Oxley, 62 INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 2005, at 19;
William J. McDonough, Promoting Public Trust, J. PUB. INQUIRY, Fall/Winter 2004–05, at 4, available at
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/fw04jpi.pdf; Deloitte’s Point of View: Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance, DELOITTE 7
(2004), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Israel/Local%20Assets/Documents/A%20Bridge%20to%20
Excellence(1).pdf; Amey Stone, SOX: Not So Bad After All?, BUSINESSWEEK.COM (July 31, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-07-31/sox-not-so-bad-after-all.
11.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19d–4 (2010) (aligning the definition of “public accounting firm” to the definition
that appears in 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a)(9) (2012), which states that a public accounting firm is “a proprietorship,
partnership, incorporated association, corporation, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or
other legal entity that is engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit reports”).

230

Journal of Business & Technology Law

CIRIC (Do Not Delete)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Pierre Ciric
disclosures by issuers registered on a U.S. Exchange.12 This liability storm already
claimed its first victim, Arthur Andersen,13 which, following its involvement in the
Enron scandal was criminally indicted14 and then later convicted on obstruction of
justice charges.15 Following this conviction, on August 31, 2002, Arthur Andersen
had to surrender its license to practice before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”),16 effectively ending the company’s operations.17 A new front
already opened in this liability storm with potential legal attacks against public

12.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(a) (2012) (Section 10A of the 1934 Act requires the audit report to include
procedures designed for the purpose of detecting illegal acts having a material impact on the financial
statements, designed to identify related party transactions which are material to the financial statements, and an
evaluation as to any doubt about the ability of the entity to continue as a going concern.).
13.
See Ken Brown and Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen’s Fall From Grace Is a Sad Tale of Greed and
Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 07, 2002, at A1. The firm of Arthur Andersen was created in 1913 by Arthur
Andersen and Clarence DeLany as Andersen, DeLany & Co. SUSAN E. SQUIRES ET AL., INSIDE ARTHUR
ANDERSEN: SHIFTING VALUES, UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 109 (2003). The firm changed its name to Arthur
Andersen & Co. in 1918. In 1989, Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting became separate units of
Andersen Worldwide. Id. at 30. The two organizations spent most of the 1990s in a bitter dispute, which ended
in 2000, when Andersen Consulting gained its independence from Arthur Andersen against a $1.2 billion
settlement and a change of name; as a result Andersen Consulting changed its name to Accenture. Id. at 92.
14.
See Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. CR H-02-121, 2002 WL
34718543 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002). This was the first time that a criminal charge was ever brought against a
major U.S. accounting firm. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged
With Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1.
15.
See Greg Farrell, Arthur Andersen Convicted of Obstruction of Justice, USA TODAY (June 15, 2002, 2:10
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/energy/enron/andersen-verdict.htm. The conviction of Arthur
Andersen was later unanimously reversed on May 31, 2005 in Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States, where the
Court held that the jury instructions were misleading as to the intent element of the obstruction of justice
charge, and that the corrupt persuasion requirement of the obstruction of justice charge required a higher
threshold of consciousness of wrongdoing. 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005).
16.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by Section 4 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(2012); see also The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact
1934 (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). The 1934 Act also authorizes the SEC to require audited financial statements in
public periodic filings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(b), 78m(a)(2) (2012); A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and
Irrational Liability, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 19, 29 (2006) (“Although the SEC briefly flirted in its early years
with the creation of uniform accounting principles under the leadership of Chairman William O. Douglas, it
ultimately chose to delegate the formulation of generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted
auditing standards to the accounting industry. Financial statements filed with the SEC were required to be
prepared in accordance with principles having ‘substantial authoritative support.’ In practice, that meant
delegation of the promulgation of accounting principles and auditing standards to the accounting industry’s
trade association, now known as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).”).
17.
See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at
A1; see also Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black, 82 NEB. L. REV.
365, 367 (2003) (referring to the collapse of Arthur Andersen); Ethan S. Burger, Regulating Large International
Accounting Firms: Should the Scope of Liability for Outside Accountants be Expanded to Strengthen Corporate
Governance and Lessen the Risk of Securities Law Violations?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (referring to the
collapse of Arthur Andersen); James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S.
TEX. L. REV. 509, 517 (2006) (discussing “the death of Arthur Andersen”); Stephan Landsman, Death of an
Accountant: the Jury Convicts Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2003)
(addressing Enron’s role in the collapse of Arthur Andersen).
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accounting firms in the aftermath of the subprime lending crisis.18 Troubling signs
of significant exposure have already surfaced in the litigation pipeline,19 and in the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) inspection reports.20
The public accounting firm fulfills a critical role, because it is considered to be
the primary watchdog over the reporting entity, both on behalf of the investing
public and on behalf of the regulatory authorities which enforce securities laws.21
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represented a significant change in the regulation process
of the public accounting industry in several ways: the accounting profession is, for
the first time, under the direct oversight of a government-sponsored organization,
the PCAOB;22 auditors are subject to new auditor independence and conflict of
interest rules;23 and Section 404 of Title IV of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a
management assessment of internal controls, which then must be tested and
certified to by the public accounting firm in charge of certifying the financial

18.
See Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407,
407–08 (2007) (summarizing the subprime lending crisis); Marie Leone, Ex-Auditors Settle Securitization
Charges, CFO.COM (Sept. 21, 2007), http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/09/ex-auditors-settlesecuritization-charges/ (summarizing the subprime lending crisis on auditors).
19.
See, e.g., In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1271 (E.D. Wash. 2007).
20.
PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., RELEASE NO. 104-2007-129, REPORT ON 2006 INSPECTION OF
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 4–6 (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Reports/
Documents/2007_PricewaterhouseCoopers.pdf.
21.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 218 (1976) (“The critical importance of the auditing
accountant’s role in insuring full disclosure cannot be overestimated. The SEC has emphasized that in certifying
statements the accountant’s duty ‘is to safeguard the public interest, not that of his client.’” (citing Touche,
Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670–671 (1957))); see also United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863
(2d Cir. 1964) (“In our complex society the accountant’s certificate and the lawyer’s opinion can be instruments
for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course, Congress did not mean that
any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability
simply because more skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress equally could not have
intended that men holding themselves out as members of these ancient professions should be able to escape
criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess.”); Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC Address at the Fall
Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Oct. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch410.htm (“[The auditing profession is] a franchise that demands you
defend and protect, above all else, the public trust; a franchise that asks you to stand firm—even under the
weight of management’s pressure to ‘see things their way’”).
22.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). Title I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board and defines its mandate (registration and inspection of public accounting firms, definition of auditing
standards, oversight of the SEC); Title II addresses the issues of auditor independence (services excluded from
the practice of auditors, partner rotation rules, auditor reports to audit committees, conflict of interest rules);
Title III addresses corporate responsibility (penalties on officers and directors, role of audit committees, rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys); Title IV addresses the enhanced financial disclosure requirements,
while Titles V through XI deal with various conflict and penalties issues. Id.
23.
See id.
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statements.24 In this new environment, the public accounting industry is subject to
two conflicting pressures: on one side, its mandate is to certify to the transparency
and accuracy that investors seek when making investment decisions, and on the
other it owes a duty to its client to manage and minimize the regulatory burdens.25
In the midst of this conflict, public accounting firms are subject to the potential risk
of considerable legal liability in private securities litigations, and, unlike other
industries, have become the subject of a unique debate, where many agree that one
cannot afford the bankruptcy or disappearance of another public accounting firm.26
For instance, following Bernard Madoff’s guilty plea in March 2009 to eleven
counts of offenses related the Ponzi scheme he facilitated through his investment
advisory firm,27 its independent auditor, David Friehling of Friehling & Horowitz

24.
Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an issuer and its public accounting firm are subject
to three different periodic certifications requirements. First, under Section 302 of the act, the issuer must follow
a set of internal procedures designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012). The
signing officers must certify that they are “responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls” and
“have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer is made known
to such officers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are
being prepared.” 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4) (2012). Second, under Section 906, the signing officers must attest to
the fair representation of the financial condition and results of operations and face criminal penalties for
misrepresentation. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). Both Section 302 and Section 906 overlap, but Section 302 “feeds
into” the Section 906 certification. Third, under Section 404(a), management is required to produce an
“internal control report” as part of each 10K Annual Report, which must attest to “the responsibility of
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting.” 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012). Under Section 404(b), external auditors are required to issue
an opinion on whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all material respects
by management. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). This is in addition to the financial statement opinion regarding the
accuracy of the financial statements.
25.
See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984) (“By certifying the public
reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as
well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from
disclosure a certified public accountant’s interpretations of the client’s financial statements would be to ignore
the significance of the accountant’s role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.”); see also
Gregory L. Paul, Not Biting the Hand That Feeds You: Public Accounting Firms and Conflicts of Interest, 34
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 325 (2004) (offering further analysis of United States v. Arthur Young & Co.).
26.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS, MANDATED STUDY ON
CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf (showing
that, in 2002, the vast majority of large corporations are audited by the “Big 4,” i.e. PwC, Deloitte, Ernst &
Young, and KPMG). One must also notice the short term economic benefit for public accounting firms
represented by the considerable increase in revenues from Sarbanes-Oxley-related activities, including Section
404 control audits, and associated consulting activities. See Andrew J. Weidman, Are We Failing the Exam?:
Many Graduates Are Not Pursuing Their CPA Certificates , ACCT. TODAY, Sept. 2006, at 29. (“If you look at the
revenue growth of public accounting firms over the past couple of years, you will see that our industry is in the
midst of an economic boom. According to a March 2006 special supplement to Accounting Today on the Top
100 Firms, over 75 percent of these firms experienced double-digit growth over the previous year.”).
27.
Seth L. Laver, Bernie Madoff and Auditor Liability: Emerging Trends and Defenses (2012) available at
http://dritoday.org/feature.aspx?id=320.
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CPAs was charged with securities fraud in March 2009.28 The SEC’s complaint
alleged that Friehling aided and abetted under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
among other things. Friehling agreed not to contest the SEC’s charges.29 Although
litigation was brought against the auditors engaged in the audits of the Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities feeder and sub-feeder funds,30 none of the auditors to
the feeder and sub-feeder funds have been held liable.31
Under federal law, public accounting firms are subject to liability for securities
fraud under either the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”),32 but only if the plaintiff investors have
succeeded in meeting a high pre-trial threshold created by the heightened pleading
requirement of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).33
Therefore, between 1995 and 2002, the courts have developed a “federal common
law”34 standard to determine whether a public accounting firm may be subject to
liability for securities fraud under the federal securities law.35 Due to the limited
professional oversight of the accounting profession and to the lack of judicial
guidance by the U.S. Supreme Court,36 the “common law” scienter standard
developed by the federal courts was inconsistent and confusing.37 However, Section
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act considerably changes the nature of the duty of care
required by public accounting firms in complying with their statutory obligations,
because it provides a new mandate, according to which the auditor must “attest to,
and report on, management’s assessment of the company’s internal control
structure and procedures.”38 Therefore, since 2002, courts have struggled to
reconcile the legal standard developed under the PSLRA heightened pleading

28.
SEC, 21274, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. DAVID F. FRIEHLING, C.P.A AND FRIEHLING &
HOROWITZ, CPA’S, P.C. 1(S.D.N.Y. CIV. 09 CV 2467) 1 (2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
Litreleases/2009/lr21274.htm.
29.
Id.
30.
See Stephenson v PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 482 Fed. Appx. 618 (2d. Cir. 2012), In re Merkin, 817
F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), Saltz v First Frontier, L.P., 485 Fed. Appx. 461 (2d. Cir. 2012).
31.
Id.
32.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 78f (2012).
33.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012) (plaintiff has to state with particularity all relevant facts for each
allegation and must show that these facts will give “rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
requisite state of mind”).
34.
See United States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Even if federal common law
otherwise would operate, it is displaced when Congress has decided the matter.”); see also Edward A. Fallone,
Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under
a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74(1997) (referring to “a kind of federal common law”
(quotation marks omitted)).
35.
See infra Section IV.
36.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194, 214 (1976).
37.
See infra note 94.
38.
See supra notes 8 and 25.
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requirement and the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.39
Although federal circuit courts have pondered on the impact of a SarbanesOxley certification securities fraud claims against insider defendants, the question
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) certification’s role on a securities fraud claim
has not yet been incorporated by the federal judiciary in the assessment of the
public accounting firm’s liability.40
This article argues that the federal courts must modify the legal standard used to
determine the scienter requirement in a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim against
a public accounting firm,41 because the Section 404(b) certification requirement,
along with the jurisprudence of the enforcement agencies, such as the PCAOB or
the SEC, can no longer be reconciled with the federal “common law” of scienter.
Courts need to revise the scienter standard in order to reconcile the federal
common law with the new guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court42 and with the
emerging standards developed by the PCAOB in its enforcement efforts.
Part II provides an overview of the evolution of the auditor’s liability from the
common law prior to the 1933 and 1934 Acts until the adoption of the PSLRA, as
well as an overview of the federal common law rule developed by courts to analyze
auditors’ liability. Part III explains two significant changes to this environment, the
Section 404(b) requirements and the new legal framework developed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor.43 Finally, Part IV explains why the courts must
reconcile the legal standard applied to auditors under the Tellabs analysis, and
provides guidance for a scienter analysis based on the case law already forming in
the enforcement efforts of the PCAOB. In particular, federal courts will have to
consider changing the “strong inference of scienter” test by incorporating the
impact of additional inferences of knowledge based on the auditor certifications.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See discussion infra Section III.
See discussion infra Section III.
See infra note 66.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id.
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II. HISTORY
A. Historical Background
The historical context for the liability of the external auditor44 has its origins in a
combination of contract law and tort law.45 Under contract law, a plaintiff can
recover only if he is able to prove that the accountant acted in an incompetent
fashion, i.e. did not follow professional standards as defined by generally accepted
accounting principles (“GAAP”) or generally accepted accounting standards
(“GAAS”).46 Under tort law, the plaintiff has to prove that the accountant acted
fraudulently, i.e. that there was intent to defraud the client through
misrepresentations in the audit.47 Historically, the liability of auditors arising out of
the review and certification of the financial representations of their clients slowly
but progressively expanded.48 Civil liability could be imposed against auditors either
on the basis of fraud, which required an intent to deceive, combined with a reliance
on the auditor’s opinion, or on the basis of negligence, which involved a lesser
degree of culpability.49 The traditional “privity”50 approach, still present within

44.
PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD.,
RULE 1001(a)(xii) at 26, available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Documents/Section_1.pdf (defining auditor, which “means both public
accounting firms registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and associated persons
thereof”), effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Rules Relating to Registration System, Exchange
Release No. 34-50,331, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 87,256 (Sept. 8, 2004), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/
pcaob/34-50331.htm. However, the PCAOB does not distinguish in Rule 1001 the external auditor is a common
expression synonymous to the PCAOB defined term of “public accounting firm,” Rule 1001 does not define the
internal auditor, who usually designates employees of the issuer hired to assess and evaluate its system of
internal control. To maintain independence, they usually present their reports directly to the Board of Directors
or to top management. In addition, as internal auditors are employees of the issuer, they are assumed to be able
to more easily find out the frauds and any accounting improprieties.
45.
See DAN L. GOLDWASSER & M. THOMAS ARNOLD, ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY 1-2 to -8 (Larry D.
Soderquist ed. 1996) (providing a detailed historical overview of the liability of accountants).
46.
See In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 707 n.26 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (defining the
GAAP standard as “the ‘basic postulates and broad principles of accounting pertaining to business enterprises,
approved by the Financial Accounting Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA)’” and GAAS as the “standards prescribed by the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA
for the conduct of auditors in the performance of an examination”). The court went on to state that “[i]n the
event there is no official pronouncement, the consensus of the accounting profession, as manifested in
textbooks, for example, determines GAAP.” Id.; see also AM. INST. OF CPAS, The Meaning of Present Fairly in
Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, AU § 9411 (2000), available at http://www.aicpa.org/
Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-00411_9.pdf (providing guidance to auditors
on GAAP); AM. INST. OF CPAS, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, AU § 316.01 (2007),
available at http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/
AU-00316.pdf (disputing the presumption of validity in the case where no GAAP rule exists).
47.
GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 41, at 4-2 to -5.
48.
Several authors have detailed the progression of the common law view of accountant liability. See, e.g.,
Richard P. Swanson, Theories of Liability, in ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS
24, 26–52 (2008), available at http://files.ali-aba.org/free/coursematerials/cr008-course.pdf; Thomas L.
Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountant’s Liability, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 213, 215 (1998).
49.
See GOLDWASSER & ARNOLD, supra note 41, at 4-37, 4-55.
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certain state jurisdictions, was to limit the auditor’s liability for negligent
misrepresentations or for intentional tortuous behavior only to its client or to third
parties known to the auditor, where the third parties intended to receive and relied
on the audit report.51 The Restatement of torts approach extended the liability for
loss suffered to any person or group of persons the auditor intended to supply the
information or knew the recipient intended to supply it.52 The so-called “California
rule,” adopted in Rosenblum v. Adler,53 expanded the auditor’s liability to any person
whom the accountant could reasonably have foreseen would obtain and rely on the
accountant’s opinion, including known and unknown investors.54
Beyond their traditional common-law and state law obligations, and following
the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, external auditors had to follow a new federal
mandate regarding audit engagements which involve corporations in which stock is
traded on a U.S. national exchange and is subject to the periodic reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act:55 first, the external auditor must comply with the
required procedures of audit performance, necessary investigation and disclosure to
the Audit Committee.56 This new requirement imbedded at the federal level the
common-law notion that the auditor is obligated to investigate or disclose any
50.
See Gossman, supra note 44, at 216 (“Privity is the connection that exists between parties to a contract.
It is essential to the maintenance of a contract action that privity exist between the plaintiff and the defendant. It
is clear that when an accountant and a client enter into a valid contract for the performance of an audit, the
accountant and the client share a relationship of privity.”); see also Swanson, supra note 44, at 27 (discussing the
role of privity in accountants’ liability).
51.
See generally Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 (1931); see also Swanson, supra note 44, at 26–
27 (“In the seminal case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, New York’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, held
that persons damaged by their reliance on an accountant’s negligently prepared financial statements who were
not in privity with the accountant may not recover, unless they could show either (i) that the accountant
defrauded them, or (ii) that the accountant actually knew they would rely on the financial statements.”);
Gossman, supra note 44, at 218 (“In substance, the Ultramares court set down the rule that an auditor will be
liable for negligent misrepresentation only to its client and to any third parties whose identities are known to
the auditor as parties intended to receive and rely on the audit report. It is significant that the Ultramares
opinion still does not refer to the latter as parties in privity, but as persons with whom the bond is ‘so close as to
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it.’ Although the intent is clear, perhaps it was yet too soon
to chance clouding the issue of who should be permitted to sue for the breach of a contract with semantic
questions of what is meant by ‘privity.’”).
52.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (1977) (extending professional liability beyond
Ultramares to the known and intended class of beneficiaries. though limited to parties for whom reliance was
actually foreseen by, rather than merely foreseeable to, the accountant.”).
53.
See Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352 (1983).
54.
See generally Steven E. Stark, Rosenblum v. Adler: Auditor’s Liabiliy for Negligent Misrepresentation—
”The Explosive Power Resident in Words,” 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939 (1984) (reviewing in detail the changes
brought by Rosenblum v. Adler).
55.
A reporting issuer will be subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act under one of three
possible approaches: (1) Section 12(b) of the 1934 Act will cover any issuer of any class of securities listed on a
National Securities Exchange; (2) Section 12(g)(1) will cover any entity with assets in excess of $10 Million, and
with a class of equity securities held by at least 500 persons; (3) Section 15(d) will cover any entity which filed a
Registration Statement under the 1933 Act, which then became effective. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78(a) to 78-4(e) (2012).
56.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012).
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matter which may be material to the financial condition of its client,57 because “it
simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose what he
knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is
being operated not to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders.”58
Second, since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor must
attest to an internal controls report prepared by the issuer.59
Up until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the oversight of the accounting
profession was very limited: The 1933 and 1934 Acts empowered the SEC to
regulate the accounting standards used in the financial statements included in the
SEC periodic requirements.60 This authority was immediately delegated to the
auditor’s trade group, the American Institute of Accountants, later renamed the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.61 It is under this authority that
the AICPA created the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) in 1978.62 The ASB
attempted to reinforce its oversight through the creation of the Public Oversight
Board (POB) in 1977, however, its lack of sanctioning power and independence
created enough political pressure for Congress to replace it by the PCAOB. It is the

57.
See Richard F. Langan, Jr., The Integrated Disclosure System, Registration and Periodic Reports Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, in TRANSACTIONAL LAWYER’S DESKBOOK: ADVISING BUSINESS ENTITIES
(Arthur N. Field & Morton Moskin eds., 2001) (indicating that Item 8 of the 10K Form is where the auditor’s
report and all detailed audited financials must be located). For a thorough review of the history of the Auditor’s
report); see also Arthur Acevedo, How Sarbanes-Oxley Should be Used to Expose the Secrets of Discretion,
Judgment, and Materiality of the Auditor’s Report, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 13 n.81 (2005) (“There are
generally four different species of auditor’s opinion contained within the standard auditor’s report. The four
variants are an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, a disclaimer opinion and an adverse opinion. The
unqualified opinion is desired by all audit clients because it is perceived to be a bill of clean health. A full review
of the reasons for and uses of the different opinions is beyond the scope of this work.”).
58.
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969).
59.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). For a general discussion of the impact of Section 404 on external auditors
see also Tosha Huffman, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts
the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L. J. 239, 253 (2004) (“[T]he external auditor must employ more tests of
internal controls than what was previously utilized to develop an audit plan. The purpose for the increased
internal control procedures is to allow the auditor to obtain a greater understanding of the operating
effectiveness of the internal controls system. Such an understanding is necessary to express an opinion on the
effectiveness of the internal controls and management’s assessment of their effectiveness.”).
60.
See supra note 17.
61.
See History of the AICPA, AM. INST. OF CPAS, www.aicpa.org/About/MissionandHistory/Pages/History
of the AICPA.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (“The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
and its predecessors have a history dating back to 1887, when the American Association of Public Accountants
(AAPA) was formed. In 1916, the American Association was succeeded by the Institute of Public Accountants,
when there was a membership of 1,150. The name was changed to the American Institute of Accountants in
1917 and remained so until 1957, when it changed to its current name of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. The American Society of Certified Public Accountants was formed in 1921 and acted as a
federation of state societies. The Society was merged into the Institute in 1936 and, at that time, the Institute
agreed to restrict its future members to CPAs.”).
62.
Auditing, Attestation and Quality Control Standards Setting Activities: Operating Policies, AM. INST. OF
CPAS 1, http://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/asb/downloadabledocuments/asb%20operating%
20policies%20document%20(2009-10).pdf.
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self-regulatory nature of the accounting profession which was cited as a
contributing factor to the lack of detection of corporate fraud by auditors.63
Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the public accounting firm is subject to two
significant risks of liability: First, under Section 11 of the 1933 Act,64 all the plaintiff
has to prove to impose liability against the public accounting firm which
contributed to the development of the registration statement, is that the document
contained a material misstatement or omission, and that the investors purchased
the security under that registration statement.65 The plaintiff need not prove any
contractual relationship with the accountant, or prove any fraudulent intent by the
external auditor or accountant who contributed to the registration process.66 Unlike
Section 11, under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, plaintiff must establish, amongst
other elements, the fraudulent intent of the auditor.67

63.
See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private
Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 990 (2005) (“As Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant at the SEC,
testified [during the Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532
(2002)]: They actually draft the standards. One of the problems with that part of the system today is, when they
go through that drafting process, since it is all being done by the firms themselves, in fact, their legal counsels
get involved in editing those very standards themselves, those standards tend to be written to protect the
accounting firms in case they get in trouble on an audit, sometimes probably which is deserved, and quite
frankly, sometimes which is not deserved. . . . It is not drafted with the public interest in mind . . . . As long as
you leave that standards setting process in the hands of the firms and of the firm’s legal counsel, you are going
to get standards written to protect them in court, as opposed to standards written to ensure that they do audits
that will protect the public.”).
64.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (codifying Section 11 of the Securities Act).
65.
Id. Under Section 11 of the 1933 Act, no scienter or reliance needs to be proven. However, Section 11
places the burden on the defendants to show their non-culpability regarding the issuance of the Registration
Statement.
66.
See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“Section 11(b)
provides: ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person . . . shall be liable as provided therein
who shall sustain the burden of proof— . . . (3) that . . . (B) as regards any part of the registration statement
purporting to be made upon his authority as an expert . . . (i) he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading . . . .’”). Against the potential Section 11 liability, the
external auditor will be entitled to assert a due diligence defense to defeat claims of negligence in discharging his
responsibilities, whereas he will be subject to potential liability only for those portions of the registration
statement they are responsible for preparing as experts.
67.
See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating requirements for
primary Rule 10b-5 claim as, “the defendant (1) made an untrue statement of material fact or omitted a
material fact that rendered misleading the statements made (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, (3) with the intent to mislead, and (4) which caused the plaintiff’s loss.” (citing Renovitch v. Kaufman,
905 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990))); Francine A. Ritter, Accountability of the Independent Accountant As
Auditor In the Wake Of Central Bank: Does the Implied Private Right of Action Survive Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 891–92 (1998) (“[Following the Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder decision,]
the Rule 10b-5 cause of action closely resembles a claim for common-law fraud. In order to set forth a
successful private Rule 10b-5 claim, plaintiffs must prove that the defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged
in manipulative or deceptive conduct, that the plaintiff relied on this conduct, and that the defendant’s conduct
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.”); see also cases cited infra note 90.
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B. Section 10(b) Liability
Under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, enacted in response to widespread abuses in the
securities markets perceived to contribute to the market crash of 1929, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC, are general anti-fraud provisions
which prohibit any person from using or employing any manipulative or deceptive
device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.68 The jurisprudence
from federal courts recognized an implied private right of action under Rule 10b5,69 but also imposed a number of requirements, most notably a deception in
connection with the securities transaction,70 the use of jurisdictional means,71 and a
requirement that plaintiffs must have standing as actual purchasers and sellers of
securities.72 For a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cause of action to be successful, plaintiff
must assert that the deception involved material information,73 that defendant acted

68.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
69.
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Ritter, supra note
63, at 890–91 (“While conceding that a strict statutory interpretation of Section 10(b) provides no express
private remedy, since 1946 federal courts have consistently recognized implied private rights of action under
both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In permitting private recovery under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, lower
federal courts have analogized the principles of tort law to the 1934 Act’s broad remedial purpose of protecting
investors. The Supreme Court of the United States has bolstered this liberal interpretation of Section 10(b) by
asserting that private recovery comports with the 1934 Act’s underlying policy objective of protecting investors
through the use of full and fair disclosure. Since defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities have attained
standing to sue under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, violators of these provisions have faced expanded
liability.”).
70.
See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819, 822 (2002) (holding that misstatements may be actionable as a
breach of fiduciary duty and as fraud in connection with securities transactions) (“[T]he SEC has consistently
adopted a broad reading of the phrase ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security’ . . . .
[Accordingly, i]t is enough that the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coincide.”).
71.
I.e. the use of instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as mails, or a national securities exchange.
72.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737–38 (1975) (recognizing that the
Birnbaum rule bars three potential classes of plaintiffs: first there are “potential purchasers of shares . . . who
allege that they decided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or the omission of
favorable material which made the issuer appear to be a less favorable investment vehicle than it actually was.
Second are actual shareholders in the issuer who allege that they decided not to sell their shares because of an
unduly rosy representationFalse Third are shareholders, creditors, and perhaps others related to an issuer who
suffered loss in the value of their investment due to corporate or insider activities in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities which violate Rule 10b-5.”).
73.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1987) (endorsing the standard of materiality for Section
10(b) causes of action from TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), whereby an omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available).
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with scienter,74 that plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or deception,75 which
caused plaintiff’s financial injuries that can be translated in measurable damages.
Therefore, the critical element a plaintiff must satisfy to establish a cause of
action under federal law is the scienter requirement, whereby the plaintiff must
prove that the auditor acted with either intent to defraud or was sufficiently reckless
in the performance of its audit that it consisted a conscious disregard of its
professional and statutory obligations.76
In the context of claims against auditors, Section 10(b) can represent a
significant risk of liability to accountants and other professionals involved in
securities transactions. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ersnt & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the fundamental challenge to a plaintiff in a Section 10(b) action was to
prove scienter.77
Given the specific mandate of the public accounting firm, how would courts
apply the scienter concept to an auditor? In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the
Supreme Court defined scienter as an “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”78
but also indicated it was willing to extend the concept of scienter to two other
possible views, one focused on the requirement of “actual knowledge of
misstatements, irrespective of intent,”79 and another view focused on manifest
reckless conduct, which “is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for
purposes of imposing liability for some act.”80 This wide spectrum of potential
interpretations left little guidance for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, as well

74.
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). (“Although the verbal formulations of
the standard to be applied have varied, several Courts of Appeals have held in substance that negligence alone is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (internal citations omitted). Other Courts of Appeals
have held that some type of scienter - i.e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of
some practice to defraud - is necessary in such an action (internal citations omitted). In this opinion the term
‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
75.
See AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing transaction
causation, where the misrepresentations caused the plaintiff to engage in a transaction, from loss causation,
which requires a finding that the unlawful conduct was the proximate cause of the economic harm).
76.
See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2003)
(“The requisite state of mind, or scienter, in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, that the plaintiff
must allege is an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” (quoting Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d
Cir. 2001))).
77.
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201 (“[Section] 10 (b) was addressed to practices that involve some
element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”).
78.
Id. at 193.
79.
Id. at 197; see Elaine E. Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10B-5: Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 219 n.31 (1977) (explaining that the existing jurisprudence
recognizes that the language of Section 10(b) covers both knowing or intentional misconduct, i.e. that
knowledge of the misconduct was sufficient to establish scienter).
80.
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
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as for federal courts.81 This lack of guidance generated significant differences and
circuit splits, which were compounded by the passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”).82
C. The Impact of the PSLRA
It is the pleading requirement of the PSLRA applied to the intent element which has
created much controversy and has become the critical factor used by courts to
dismiss cases early in the litigation process as it relates to auditors.83 Following a
perceived increase of frivolous securities fraud suits aimed at extracting quick
settlements using Section 10(b)-based claims, Congress passed the PSLRA to ensure
that the heavy burden of discovery processes under federal securities law against
corporations and their external auditors would be limited.84 The main procedural
tool designed by Congress to correct this perceived inequity was to create a
significant exception to the liberal notice-pleading doctrine of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by imposing heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud

81.
See Bucklo, supra note 80, at 226–27 (“Although the Supreme Court initially attempted to define
scienter in concrete, categorical terms, an analysis of its subsequent language reveals considerable confusion as
to the degree of culpability that the Court intended to require a plaintiff seeking damages under rule 10b-5 to
plead and prove. In fact, the Court’s opinion in Ernst & Ernst is susceptible of being read to support any of three
definitions of scienter—intent, knowledge or recklessness. The Court’s analysis of Section 10(b)’s language,
history and especially its interdependence with other federal securities provisions indicates that it clearly would
include intentional misrepresentation and almost certainly knowledge in its definition of scienter, leaving the
sufficiency of recklessness in question. On the recklessness question, the opinion provided enough support for
both sides of the issue to justify taking the Court at its word as to the openness of that issue.”).
82.
See discussion infra note 84.
83.
Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV.
1097, 1101 (2007).
84.
See Kevin P. Roddy, Nine Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 749,
756, available at Westlaw SL020 ALI-ABA 749, 756 (2005) (“The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PSLRA”) was enacted by Congress on December 22, 1995 over President Clinton’s veto. Several district
courts have stated that the PSLRA was intended ‘to combat the filing of abusive and meritless lawsuits.’
(quoting Carson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *10 (W.D. Ark. Mar.
30, 1998))); see also David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach To Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 In Light of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1810–1813 (2000) (explaining in the
legislative history of the PSLRA, the lobbying role of the public accounting firms and the committee negotiation
process in both houses of Congress); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private
Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2000) (arguing that the PSLRA discourages valid fraud claims
from being brought); see generally Sanford P. Dumain, Accountants’ Liability, Class Action Suits, Auditor
Liability, and the Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in ACCOUNTANTS’ LIABILITY: ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 205 (2006), available at Westlaw SL064 ALI-ABA 205.
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claims.85 To successfully bring a Section 10(b) action, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a
misleading statement or omission of a material fact; (2) made in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4)
reliance; and (5) damages.”86 It is the pleading of the intent element which has
created much controversy and has become the critical factor used by courts to
dismiss cases early in the litigation process.87 To survive a motion to dismiss, a
plaintiff must allege with particularity sufficient facts, which will allow the court to
establish a “strong inference” of scienter.88 Under the PSLRA pleading requirement,
which forces the plaintiff to make particular factual allegations, a court will grant
the motion to dismiss if the allegations in the complaint are general or “conclusory
in nature.”89 Under the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence,90 the basic requirement
used to evaluate the state of mind of external auditors is that plaintiffs must prove
“that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit
at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or
that the accounting judgments made were such that no reasonable accountant
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”91 Similarly,
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs, to allege scienter, must include in the complaint
specific facts showing that the audit deficiencies were “so severe that they strongly
suggest that the auditor must have been aware of the corporation’s fraud.”92 This
heightened pleading requirement has been recognized to be a strong barrier to
securities fraud claims involving external auditors,93 and the federal jurisprudence
in all circuits has shown that it has become more difficult to plead scienter against
external auditors than against corporate insiders, and that the threshold against an

85.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012) (“the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed”); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012) (“the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”).
86.
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1997).
87.
Gideon, supra note 79.
88.
In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 717–18 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
89.
Id. at 737.
90.
See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
91.
PR Diamonds Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Worlds of Wonder
Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)).
92.
Cardinal Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (citing PR Diamonds Inc., 364 F.3d at 694)).
93.
See Edward P. Leibensperger & Lauren M. Papenhausen, Auditor Liability For Securities Fraud After the
PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, 28 ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 15, 18 (2004) (“The heightened pleading
requirement of the Reform Act is particularly difficult to meet in cases brought against auditors. A developing
line of Reform Act cases recognizes that it is more difficult to plead scienter with respect to independent
auditors than to corporate insiders. Courts have often dismissed securities fraud complaints against auditors
even where the complaints have adequately pled claims alleging accounting improprieties against the auditors’
client.”).
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external auditor is higher than for the insider defendant, making it more difficult to
plead scienter against external auditors than against corporate insiders.94
Because the PSLRA did not precisely define the required state of mind or provide
a standard as to whether a strong inference of that state of mind has been pled
adequately, various circuit courts have differed in their application of the PSLRA’s
scienter pleading requirements.95 While the Second and Third Circuits found that
circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s “motive and opportunity” were
sufficient to properly infer scienter, the Ninth Circuit rejected this “motive and
opportunity” test and adopted a conservative reading of the Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder view of intent, by requiring that plaintiffs “must state facts that come
closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and opportunity.”96
Between these two extreme views across the possible interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s scienter standard, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the “recklessnessonly” view of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. Although the Sixth Circuit rejected the
“motive and opportunity” test by holding that “the bare pleading of motive and
opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute the pleading of a strong inference
of scienter,”97 a plaintiff may establish scienter by alleging recklessness, defined as
“highly unreasonable conduct” representing “an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care,” which is akin to “conscious disregard.”98 The threshold
analysis required by the Sixth Circuit “differs from the Ninth Circuit in that it has
left open the possibility that detailed allegations of motive and opportunity might
be sufficient if they ‘simultaneously establish that the defendant acted recklessly or
knowingly, or with the requisite state of mind.’”99 To attempt to apply these various
approaches objectively, the various federal circuits established a number of different

94.
Id. (“Courts have found that auditors warrant different treatment from corporate insiders for purposes
of pleading scienter because they have less to gain (in terms of stock options or fees) and more to lose (in terms
of their professional reputation) than do corporate insiders.”).
95.
See generally Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Split Widens on Scienter Pleading Standard Under
the PSLRA, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Se p/1/127316.html (summarizing
each circuit’s handling of the scienter requirement).
96.
In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA requires
plaintiff to plead “deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”).
97.
In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
98.
See id. at 550; see also Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979).
Although there are some similarities between the Sixth Circuit’s approach and the standard adopted by the
Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has not gone so far as to require a securities fraud plaintiff to allege “deliberate
recklessness.”
99.
Robert W. Perrin, Brian T. Glennon & Julie R.F. Gerchik, The State of Scienter: A Comparative Survey
Ten Years After the Enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, LEGALWORKS, Dec.-Jan. 2006, at 4
(quoting Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979)). See Christopher M.
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 606–07 (2002); see also Dumain, supra note 80, at 221 (“The
Sixth Circuit has taken a middle course, holding that scienter could be alleged by pleading facts that give rise to
a strong inference of recklessness, but refusing to accept the proposition that allegations of motive and
opportunity to commit fraud were sufficient to plead scienter, unless the facts demonstrate the required state of
mind, namely that the defendant acted recklessly or knowingly.”).
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approaches: While the Second and Third Circuits focused on an analysis of the
motive and opportunity of defendants, the Sixth Circuit relied on the so-called
“Helwig” factors, first identified in Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,100 which enumerates
objective factors used to establish scienter in securities fraud actions.101
Another example of the confusion between the circuits is the type of facts
required in a PSLRA pleading. For instance, a recurring question is whether
significant violations of GAAP and GAAS principles are sufficient on their own to
establish a strong inference of scienter on the part of the outside auditor. In most
circuits, it has been well-established that alleging a violation of GAAP or GAAS is
not sufficient, by itself, to establish a strong inference of scienter on the part of an
outside auditor, even if the auditor is grossly negligent in carrying out its
responsibilities.102 Rather, courts usually require additional evidence of intent or
recklessness, such as facts placing a reasonable auditor on notice of wrongdoing,
which the auditor chose to ignore, usually called “red flags.”103 However, it is clear
that the circuit split regarding the facts necessary to establish scienter under the
PSLRA shows that no consensus exists as to the level of recklessness required to
reach a minimum threshold necessary to fall within the Ernst & Ernst standard.104

100.
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated by Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24 (2007).
101.
Id. (establishing the “Helwig” factors as: “(1) insider trading at a suspicious time or in an unusual
amount; (2) divergence between internal reports and external statements on the same subject; (3) closeness in
time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the later disclosure of inconsistent information; (4)
evidence of bribery by a top company official; (5) existence of an ancillary lawsuit charging fraud by a company
and the company’s quick settlement of that suit; (6) disregard of the most current factual information before
making statements; (7) disclosure of accounting information in such a way that its negative implications could
only be understood by someone with a high degree of sophistication; (8) the personal interest of certain
directors in not informing disinterested directors of an impending sale of stock; and (9) the self-interested
motivation of defendants in the form of saving their salaries or jobs”). The reason Helwig is often cited is that it
is the only case that attempts to define specific objective factors in the scienter analysis rather than subjective
criteria such as an auditor’s motives.
102.
See Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Allegations of a violation of GAAP
provisions or SEC regulations, without corresponding fraudulent intent, are not sufficient to state a securities
fraud claim.”); see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir. 1994) (“boilerplate averments that the
accountants violated particular accounting standards are not, without more, sufficient to support inferences of
fraud”); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that allegations concerning
violations of general accounting principles were insufficient to properly plead securities fraud in conformance
with Rule 9(b)); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., No. 98-6879-CIV-GOLD, 2000 WL 1140306, at *11 (S.D. Fla.
July 31, 2000) (“Courts uniformly hold that allegations of GAAP and GAAS violations are insufficient, without
more, to state a securities fraud claim.”); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 182 F.R.D. 370, 375 (D. Mass. 1998)
(scienter cannot be established by “generalized allegations of violations”). Indeed, GAAP or GAAS violations
may show that an auditor or accountant was grossly negligent, however, without more, there cannot be a strong
inference of scienter. See Reiger v. Altris Software, No. 98-CV-528-TW-JFS, 1999 WL 540893, at *7 (S.D. Cal.
April 30. 1999) (“[A]llegations that an accountant or auditor conducted an inadequate audit by violating
accounting or auditing principles do not, without more, adequately plead a strong inference of scienter.”).
103.
See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1026, 1030, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 2000); see also
infra note 221and accompanying text (defining “red flag”).
104.
See Bucklo, supra note 80, at 226.
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The PLSRA introduced several other requirements, both substantive and
procedural, designed to prevent frivolous lawsuits from being filed, which have a
significant impact on claims against public accounting firms.105 On the substantive
side, the PSLRA replaced the joint and several liability under recklessness or
negligence claims with proportionate liability.106 Procedurally, the main change
impacting claims against auditors are the appointment of a lead plaintiff107 and a
required stay of discovery, where the discovery is stayed during the pendency of a
motion to dismiss.108 Additionally, the PSLRA codifies standards providing that
financial statement audits required under the securities laws must include
procedures designed to provide a reasonable assurance of detecting material illegal
acts. This codification describes how the auditor, upon the discovery of illegal acts,
must inform the issuer’s management, and if an illegal act is determined to have a
material effect on the financial statements, and if senior management fails to take
appropriate remedial actions, how the auditor must report to the board of directors
and to the SEC.109 These new provisions and associated SEC rules did show that
Congress, even before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, identified an increased affirmative
disclosure obligations of the auditor to the entity and the SEC regarding material
misrepresentations imbedded in the financial statements.

105.
Dumain, supra note 80, at 210.
106.
The PSLRA imposes several other substantive changes, including heightened pleading requirements
for material misrepresentations and for the defendant’s state of mind, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) to (2) (2012),
specific calculation rules for the measure of damages based on objectively measured stock price points, 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(4) (2012), the codification of the loss causation rule, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012), an
enhancement to the safe-harbor protection for forward-looking statements by issuers, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5
(2012), and the preserving of aiding and abetting claims by the SEC under section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3
(2012). For proportionate liability, the PSLRA replaces traditional joint and several liability by proportionate
liability for claims based on “non-knowing” conduct against outside directors under Section 11 of the 1933 Act
and against all persons for claims under the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g) (2012).
107.
Within 90 days of publication of the notice, the court appoints a lead plaintiff from among those who
have filed a complaint or moved to serve as lead plaintiff, usually the person(s) having the largest financial
interest in the case. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012).
108.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b) (2012) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court
finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party.”); see also Brian Philip Murray, Lifting the PSLRA “Automatic Stay” Of Discovery,
80 N.D. L. REV. 405, 405 (2004) (suggesting that the automatic stay rule may not have the destructive effect the
plaintiff’s bar claimed the rule had on valid suits because courts increasingly lift the stay).
109.
Section 301 of the PSLRA added new Section 10A to the 1934 Act, which requires auditors to adopt
procedures that will give reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts and that will identify related-party
transactions. The SEC has adopted rules, effective April 17, 1997, to implement Section 10A. See
Implementation of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,743, 12,748 (Mar. 12, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240 (2011).
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D. Primary Liability for Secondary Actors under Section 10(b)
Public accounting firms may only face liability for securities fraud in a Section
10(b) claim if the plaintiff successfully pleads that the auditor was a primary
perpetrator of securities fraud.110 In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver,111 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal securities laws impose
liability only on primary perpetrators of securities fraud, and do not create liability
against secondary actors, who usually are bankers, auditors, or attorneys, for aiding
and abetting primary violations.112 Therefore, claims, which would only describe an
auditor conspiring to assist a corporate insider to defraud investors, would not face
liability under Section 10(b).113
Although distinguishing between a primary actor and a secondary actor can be
difficult, most courts agree that while the primary violator is the one who violates a
prohibited act set forth by the statute, the secondary violator, although not
performing the prohibited act, has responsibility for it if he or she assists or has a
relationship with the primary violator.114 Another circuit split emerged as to how to
determine whether an auditor, usually held to be a secondary actor, can be held
liable under Section 10(b) under one of two primary liability theories. Some courts
followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit by applying a “substantial participation” or
“intricate involvement” standards, where an auditor may be held liable under
Section 10(b) if the auditor was “substantially involved” in the misrepresentations
or omissions in the financial statements which supported the fraud.115 Other courts,
110.
See Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.8 (10th. Cir. 1996) (“therefore,
aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation cannot be the basis of liability in private actions still before the courts”
(citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991))). “The absence of § 10(b) aiding and
abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities
relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 are met.” Id. at 1224.
111.
See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191–92 (1994).
112.
Id. at 191.
113.
See Mary M. Wynne, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why The Second Circuit’s “Bright
Line” Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1607, 1611–12 (2000); see generally William H. Kuehnle,
Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and
Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313 (1989) (defining conspiracy
liability and providing background information on the issue).
114.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115.
See Wynne, supra note 109, at 1613–14. For authority on “substantial participation,” see, for example,
In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an accounting firm’s
substantial participation in drafting and editing misleading letters to the SEC was sufficient to support claim of
primary liability); Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that
plaintiffs could allege primary liability against accountant based upon various statements and reports issued by
company); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that primary
liability can be based on accounting firm’s central role in drafting misleading statements); In re ZZZZ Best Sec.
Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that an auditor may be primarily liable for securities
fraud even if false statements could not be reasonably attributed to it).
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following the Second Circuit, developed a more restrictive approach, by applying a
so-called “bright line” standard, whereby liability for secondary actors, like
auditors, will only be found when the defendant actually made a fraudulent
misstatement or omission and such a misstatement or omission can be attributed to
them.116 Yet the Second Circuit developed a third approach by considering the
auditor as a primary actor in a Section 10(b) claim, and by holding that the auditor
has a duty to correct its certified opinion. In Overton v. Todman,117 the Second
Circuit, by expanding the duty owed by auditors in their certification to all
shareholders who rely on their opinion, is essentially transforming the auditor into
a primary actor of a potential fraud or misrepresentation.
In Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,118 the U.S. Supreme
Court cited and reaffirmed its decision in Central Bank.119 The court reaffirmed that
there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting a Section 10(b) violation.120
The Court notes that the decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create
an express cause of action for aiding and abetting, but even though then-SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt recommended that aiding and abetting liability in private
claims be established, Congress did not follow this course.121 Section 10(b) right of
action does not extend to aiders and abettors, unless the conduct of the secondary
actor satisfies each of the elements or preconditions for liability.122
Therefore, for Section 10(b) claims against auditors, plaintiffs still have to defeat
the heightened pleading requirement created by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995,123 have to plead primary violations, and have to defeat a
number of evidentiary challenges when using financial information audited by the
public accounting firm.

116.
See In re MTC Elec. Techs. S’holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[I]f Central Bank
is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held
liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how
substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).”); see also Wright v. Ernst &
Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for
a statement not attributed to the actor.”).
117.
478 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2007).
118.
128 S.Ct. 761 (2008).
119.
See id. at 768.
120.
Id. at 767.
121.
Id. at 768-9; S. Hearing No. 103-759, pp. 13-14(1994).
122.
Id. at 769. The plaintiff must prove the following elements or preconditions to extend liability to
secondary actors:”(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Id. at 768.
123.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
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E. How should the scienter analysis be applied to the facts pled?
Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides that the auditor must
“attest to, and report on, management’s assessment of the company’s internal
control structure and procedures.”124 Therefore, since 2002, courts struggled with
reconciling the increase in liability due to the failure in the new certification
obligations and the PSLRA heightened pleading requirement language.
The approach towards analyzing the pleaded facts individually or collectively is
critical in ensuring that the proper legal standard is applied to a claim. Prior to the
passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs in securities fraud claims attempted to satisfy their
burden of pleading scienter by “alleging that a series of concededly true statements,
taken together, or as a ‘mosaic,’ gave a false impression to the market as a result of
alleged omissions.”125 However, the PSLRA has been interpreted as rejecting this
approach, because the statutory language states, “each statement alleged to have
been misleading.” The wording was thought to require that the heightened pleading
requirement as well as the strong inference of scienter would be driven by each
allegation or statement on its own.126 Consequently, the so-called “mosaic theory”
was thought to be rejected by Congress.127 However, this view was premature. A
number of decisions across the country demonstrate that the courts are showing a
renewed interest in the approach.
The mosaic theory concept first made a comeback in the judicial review of the
materiality element in Section 10(b) claims where “each individual piece of
information at issue must be evaluated in the context of the overall impression
created by the statements as a whole.”128
Courts then extended their renewed interest with the mosaic theory approach to
the scienter pleading requirement analysis. In Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc.,129
although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that
scienter was insufficiently pleaded as to individual statements, the court observed
that, “[w]hile the district court did a detailed analysis of the Appellants’ separate
arguments for scienter,” the “allegations of scienter must be collectively
considered,” whereby, “[b]eyond each individual allegation we also consider
‘whether the total of plaintiffs’ allegations, even though individually lacking, are
sufficient to create a strong inference that defendants acted with deliberate or
124.
15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2007).
125.
Richard L. Jacobson & Joshua R. Martin, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Survey
of the First Three Years, in SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES: A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS 861, 865 (1999).
126.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
127.
The term “mosaic theory” is a generic term used in many unrelated fields but in the US legal context,
“mosaic theory” is used synonymously with the “totality of the circumstances” test.
128.
Phillip Wesley Lambert, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the Additional Criminal
Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839, 848 (2003).
129.
339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003).

Vol. 9, No. 2 2014

249

CIRIC (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place
conscious recklessness.”130 Because the trial court did not apply the “totality of the
allegations” test, the Court of Appeals remanded the case.131 Again, the mosaic
theory proved critical in the Eleventh Circuit Lattice decision,132 where the District
Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss a securities fraud class action. The
Lattice court concluded that plaintiffs as a whole raised a strong inference that
defendants acted with scienter because even though GAAP violations considered
individually were not necessarily indicative of scienter, the significance of them,
along with a long list of other specific claims,133 when viewed in the totality of the
allegations added additional weight to the inference of scienter.
Similarly, in In re Rent-Way Securities Litigation,134 the court found that plaintiffs’
allegations against the external auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), supported
an inference of scienter because all the allegations put together collectively gave rise
to a strong inference of recklessness at least.135 Plaintiffs claimed that PwC’s scienter
could be inferred from the magnitude and duration of the fraud, which had a
considerable impact on the stock price, PwC’s “serial violations” of GAAP and
GAAS,136 PwC’s knowledge that Rent-Way’s internal accounting structure and
controls were inadequate,137 and PwC’s disregard for a number of “red flags.”138 The
Rent-Way court noted that none of the individual allegations, standing alone,
would be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement, however, when combined
with “red flags,” the allegations here satisfied the pleading standard of the PSLRA,139
and the court concluded that the allegations supported a strong inference of
scienter.140
The re-emergence of the mosaic theory in the application of the PSLRA
heightened pleading requirement has a significant impact on how to weigh a
Section 404(b) certification in the scienter analysis. Federal courts will no longer be
able to analyze a Section 404(b) certification in isolation and conclude whether the

130.
Id. at 940 (quoting No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. America West
Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 938 (9th Cir. 2003)).
131.
Id. at 940–41.
132.
In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at *19 (D. Or.
Jan. 3, 2006).
133.
Id. at *19–20 (noting that the additional allegations included the design and operation of the
company’s internal controls, which were the subject of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, the defendants’ alleged
motive to inflate the company stock to avoid a goodwill write-off, the desire to keep newly issued options
“above water,” and to maximize executives bonuses).
134.
209 F. Supp. 2d 493 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
135.
Id. at 511.
136.
Id. at 506.
137.
Id. at 508.
138.
Id. at 508–509 (noting that the specific allegations include Rent-Way’s weak internal accounting
controls, improperly functioning software systems, manually adjusted general ledger entries, and declining
expense ratios during a period of growth).
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 507, 509, 511.
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certification is a stand-alone “silver bullet,”141 but rather will have to draw the
appropriate inferences from the certification and analyze this inference collectively
with other inferences drawn from other parts of the complaint. This approach was
effectively endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tellabs v. Makor.142
F. A partial resolution of the scienter analysis circuit split: Tellabs v. Makor
On June 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court provided decisive guidance in resolving
the circuit split which had developed since 1995 regarding the proper analysis of the
scienter requirement in a Section 10(b) claim.143 In Tellabs, the U.S. Supreme Court
developed a framework for federal courts to evaluate whether a plaintiff did “state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.”144 By vacating the opinion of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, Justice Ginsburg rejected the notion that strong inference was
met if the particularized facts could lead a “reasonable man” to infer that the
defendant acted with the required intent, which was a lower threshold than the
“most plausible of competing inferences” standard advocated by the Sixth and
Second circuits.145 The Tellabs decision provides several directions which are critical
to the auditor’s liability risk in the context of a Section 404(b) certification.
First, the Tellabs decision seems to provide a framework for scienter analysis for
both insiders and secondary actors, such as auditors. There is no attempt by the
court to differentiate the analysis based on the type of defendants, which has been a
consistent approach by the U.S. Supreme Court every time the issue of scienter has
been reviewed.146 Therefore, the Tellabs approach will become the framework for
future cases involving auditor liability under Section 10(b).
Second, the Tellabs court provides its understanding of the strong inference of
scienter requirement, by confirming that courts should only be looking indicia of
“strong” or “powerful or cogent” inferences, meaning “‘[p]owerful to demonstrate
or convince.”147 Therefore, the Tellabs court abandoned the notion that the PSLRA

141.
See MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1093 (10th ed. 1993) (“silver bullet: Something that
acts as a magical weapon; esp one that instantly solves a long-standing problem”).
142.
551 U.S. 308 (2007).
143.
Id. at 319–20, 322–23.
144.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
145.
Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2004).
146.
The only three cases where the scienter element in Section 10(b) claims was part of the central holding
are Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 322– 23 (2007), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), and
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980) (which holds that the scienter requirement applies to injunction
proceedings brought by the SEC).
147.
Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007) (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (2d ed. 1989)
(defining “strong”)).
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was meant to filter complaints which included facts able to raise the strongest or the
most plausible of inferences.
Third, the Tellabs court provided realistic guidance to federal courts by
recognizing that the strength of that inference can not be tested in a vacuum, and
actually prescribes a clear step-by-step approach:
First, faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a §10(b) action, courts
must, as with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which
relief can be granted, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true. . . Second, courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as
other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice. . . Third, in determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a
‘strong’ inference of scienter, the court must take into account plausible
opposing inferences. . . The inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is
it that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying
facts? To determine whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that give rise to
the requisite ‘strong inference’ of scienter, a court must consider plausible
non-culpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences
favoring the plaintiff. The inference that the defendant acted with scienter
need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the most
plausible of competing inferences.148
Once all proper competing inferences are drawn on the basis of the complaint
and the competing motions, a court should conclude “[a] complaint will survive. . .
only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least
as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”149
Fourth, the Tellabs decision resolves a critical aspect of the pleading questions
which arose after the passage of the PLSRA. Prior to Tellabs, it was not clear to a
court whether each fact pled by the plaintiff needed to satisfy the strong inference of
scienter requirement separately, or whether the mosaic theory should be the
governing approach.150 Clearly, the language of the court resolves this question by
incorporating the mosaic theory in the legal framework federal courts must use in
the scienter analysis by noting that all inferences must be considered in evaluating a

148.
Id. at 322–24.
149.
Id. at 324.
150.
See Danniella Casseres, Comment, South Cherry Street, LLC v. Hennessee Group LLC: Investors’
Desperate Plea for Second Circuit Standards, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 231, 241–43 (2011) (discussing the varying
standards adopted by different circuits regarding the pleading of scienter).

252

Journal of Business & Technology Law

CIRIC (Do Not Delete)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Pierre Ciric
complaint under the PSLRA, those favorable and unfavorable to the plaintiff.151
Based on this analysis, the court endorsed the approach already adopted by the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits which stressed “when determining whether plaintiffs have
shown a strong inference of scienter, the court must consider all reasonable
inferences,”152 and that on such motions, when determining whether a strong
inference of scienter has been pled, district courts should “make an individualized
assessment that sweeps before it the totality of the facts in a given case.”153
Fifth, Justice Ginsburg confirmed the burden to the plaintiff in the motion to
dismiss, which consisted of providing enough particularized facts enabling the
“strong inference of scienter” to comply with a preponderance of the evidence
burden, because “a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she would be required
to prove at trial.”154
The Tellabs decision provides a new framework for federal courts to apply a
scienter analysis of Section 10(b) securities fraud claims. As applied to the public
accounting industry, the Tellabs framework represents a significant change which
will require courts to modify their approach in concluding at the pre-trial motion
to dismiss stage whether a plaintiff satisfied the PSLRA heightened pleading
requirement. To do so, a circuit court will have to draw all proper inferences, then
conclude whether a “reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.”155
This new test is significantly different than the Ninth Circuit motive and
opportunity approach and rejects the most plausible inference approach from the
Second Circuit. Rather the Tellabs decision tends to support the Sixth Circuit’s
approach, and abandons any subjective factor such as the defendant’s motive or
opportunity.156

151.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
152.
Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002).
153.
In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Federal
courts have been quick to endorse the totality of circumstances test pronounced in Tellabs. See Middlesex
Retirement System v. Quest Software Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[u]nder Tellabs and
Gompper the Court must consider these facts in their totality”).
154.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323, 328–29.
155.
Id. at 324.
156.
See Kevin P. Roddy, Nine Years of Practice and Procedure Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, A.L.I. 36–40 (July 8, 2005), http://www.wilentz.com/files/articlesandpublicationsfilefiles/82/article
publicationfile/roddywebsiteattachmentjune2005.pdf (describing a number of cases in the Second Circuit
applying the “motive and opportunity” formulation for pleading scienter).
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III. THE FEDERAL “COMMON LAW” STANDARD APPLIED TO
AUDITORS NEEDS TO BE RECONCILED WITH THE SECTION 404(B)
REQUIREMENTS
A. The PCAOB Oversight
The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had a significant impact on the
public accounting firm: For the first time, the accounting industry is directly
regulated by a private-sector non-profit organization, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (or PCAOB), which oversees registered public
accounting firms and acts as a direct emanation of the SEC.157 Under the SarbanesOxley Act,158 the SEC appoints the Board’s members after consultation with the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Secretary of the Treasury.159 Unlike the prior oversight body (AIPCA), the budget of
the PCAOB is approved by the SEC and is funded by feeds mostly paid by the U.S.
issuers, which preserves independence from the accounting industry.160 Under
Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB is the entity entrusted to register
public accounting firms that prepare audit reports, to set all of the auditing and
ethical standards supporting the preparation of audit reports by issuers, and to
conduct periodic inspections of the public accounting firms.161 Like the SEC, the
PCAOB has the power to conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings
against accounting firms or their partners, and may impose sanctions upon either
the firms or associated persons.162
In 2006, an accounting firm and a conservative non-profit group challenged the
constitutionally of the PCAOB, on the grounds that the PCAOB violates separationof-powers principles, the Appointments Clause,163 and the non-delegation
doctrine.164 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
PCAOB, with the exception of the conditions for removal of Board members.165

157.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §101(a), 15 U.S.C. §7211(a) (2012).
158.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4) (2010). The SEC named the first Board members on October 25, 2002. The
Act requires that two of the five Board members be or have been certified public accountants. The Act also
requires that all members of the Board serve on a full-time basis. See http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_
PCAOB/The_Board/index.aspx.
159.
Id.
160.
2014 budget is $258.4 million, SEC Approves 2014 PCAOB Budget and Accounting Support Fee, (Feb.
14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540791494#.Uwu0f3lzrwI.
161.
See supra note 155.
162.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4) (2010).
163.
See Free Enter. Fund v. The Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
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B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404(b) Requirements
Section 404 represents the most controversial of Sarbanes-Oxley’s new obligations.
Section 404(a) puts the burden on the issuer to attest that the annual report must
contain an internal control report expressing two key outcomes, which are
management’s acknowledgment of responsibility for establishing and maintaining
adequate internal controls for financial reporting, and management’s assessment as
to the effectiveness of the internal controls.166 Additionally, Section 404(b)167 puts
the burden on the public accounting firm in charge of auditing the issuer’s financial
statements to certify its independent evaluation of management’s assessment of
internal controls.168 Under Section 404(b), the company’s auditors “shall attest to,
and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer.”169 Pursuant
to its newly created statutory power,170 and to ensure a uniform enforcement of this
mandate, the PCAOB needed to implement this requirement on auditors via the
publication of an Accounting Standard,171 which would allow the auditor to
consistently implement the attestation and report required by Section 404(b). To
fulfill this obligation, on March 9, 2004, the PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard
No. 2 (“AS 2”).172 This standard established the approaches an auditor must use to
comply with section 404(b)’s attestation to management’s assessment of the

166.
See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012).
167.
15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).
168.
For the SEC’s view on the definition of the “Internal Control Over Financial Reporting,” see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-15 (“The term internal control over financial reporting is defined as a process designed by, or under
the supervision of, the issuer’s principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar
functions, and effected by the issuer’s board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and includes those policies
and procedures that:
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer;
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of
the issuer are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the issuer;
and
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or
disposition of the issuer’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.”).
169.
15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).
170.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (2007). Section 103(a)(1) directs the
Board to establish auditing and related attestation standards to be used by registered public accounting firms, as
may be necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors.
171.
Id.
172.
See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
(2004) [hereinafter AS 2], available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket008/2004-03-09_Release_
2004-001-all.pdf, effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, Exchange Act
Release No. 49,884, 69 Fed. Reg. 35,083 (S.E.C. June 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/3449884.htm.
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effectiveness of its internal control. Under AS 2, the auditor must test the internal
controls of the issuer in a systematic fashion through sampling methodologies, and
to preserve the independence of the work and the certification of the auditor,
cannot be involved in the controls performed by the issuer.173 The goal of this
process is to ensure that the auditor obtains a full understanding of the operating
effectiveness of the internal controls systems of the issuer, and may express a proper
opinion on the effectiveness of the internal controls systems and on management’s
assessment of their effectiveness.174 Beyond the compliance costs involved in these
testing processes, this standard creates a number of obligations which have the
potential to greatly impact the legal liability of the auditor in the future.
First, unlike prior auditing standards issued by the ICPA, whereby the auditor
was allowed enormous discretion in the size and extent of the testing process
performed by the auditor to audit financial transactions, Section 404(b) along with
AS 2, requires the auditor to engage in a complete and full-scale control audit of
enough transaction and processes to enable him to certify to effectiveness of the
issuer’s control systems.175 In the context of a Section 10(b) cause of action against
the auditor, this new approach may considerably diminish a defense of ignorance
against the claim of knowledge required in the scienter analysis.176 Prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, because a financial audit was highly dependent upon the size
and representativeness of the sampling performed during the audit, a defense of
negligence was available to the auditor if the fraud or misrepresentation involved
activities not covered in the sample of activities covered by the audit. Under
Section 404(b), the requirement of a complete coverage of all internal controls
necessary for the auditor to comply with the certification considerably diminishes
the availability of this defense. Under Section 404(b), a defense of lack of actual
knowledge by the auditor of a wrong, fraud, or misrepresentation could easily be
countered with an inference of the auditor’s knowledge of the processes and
controls of the issuer.
Second, the approach of AS 2 creates a distinct obligation for the auditor to
perform its own testing of the effectiveness of the internal control systems, rather
than just relying on or endorsing the testing and the assessment of the issuer.177
This approach will also render unavailable a defense of reliance on testing
procedures and results originating from the entity, where the financial controls may

173.
Id. at §§ 51–52.
174.
Id. at §§ 153–155.
175.
Id. at §§ 150–51, 157.
176.
See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling In The Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and The Implications of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1074 n.308 (2004). (“As auditors must now
apprise the audit committee of the details of the internal controls, or lack thereof, ignorance is no longer a
defense.”).
177.
AS 2, supra note 162, §§ 161–166.
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have been deficient, insufficient, or in the worst case, designed to prevent finding a
specific accounting fraud or financial misrepresentation.
Third, the auditor now has an affirmative duty to disclose a material weakness or
a significant deficiency in the internal controls of the issuer,178 which is a separate
obligation from the requirement to issue an adverse opinion on the
representativeness of the financial statements.179 The failure of the auditor to
comply with this obligation to warn of the lack of effectiveness in the internal
controls considerably increases its liability, at least vis-à-vis the PCAOB.180
While the reliability of such warnings is the subject of an intense debate, the legal
implications of these new requirements may be substantial.
First, the primary impact of requiring the auditor to make an affirmative
statement on the effectiveness of the financial controls that support the financial
statements the auditor also certifies to is that the plaintiff investor’s attempt to
make the auditor a primary actor will be greatly enhanced. Any presumption that
the auditor may not have been exposed to a material event which did not find its
way into the financial statement, or that the auditor may not have been aware of
significant financial fraudulent activities, will be considerably diminished.181 Under
Stoneridge the risk to the auditor for failing to submit an affirmative statement may
be reduced because a secondary actor is not liable for aiding and abetting under
Section 10(b).182 However, the failure to submit an affirmative statement may
continue to be indicia of fraud and expose the accountant to civil liability if the
plaintiff can show that it relied upon the lack of affirmative statement, along with
other deceptive acts.183
In addition, the liability of the auditor may be increased in situations where the
financial statements opinion and the internal control opinions diverge,184 most

178.
Id. at §§ 175–177.
179.
Id.
180.
See Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections and Audits in the Post-SOX
Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 87 (2007) (“If a registered CPA firm does not cooperate with an investigation,
the PCAOB may institute a disciplinary proceeding. Non-cooperation is evident if the CPA firm ‘failed to
comply with [a PCAOB] demand, . . . knowingly made any false material declaration,’ or ‘abused the
[PCAOB’s] processes for purposes of obstructing an investigation . . . .’ If it appears to the PCAOB that
disciplinary proceedings are appropriate, the PCAOB must conduct a non-public hearing. Disciplinary cases
from the PCAOB become public if the PCAOB makes a final determination, such as the imposition of
sanctions. Permissible sanctions include temporarily suspending or permanently revoking registration, barring
an individual from further association with a registered CPA firm, prohibiting a firm from accepting new audit
clients for a period of time, or imposing significant civil monetary penalties.”).
181.
Id.
182.
Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. 761.
183.
Id. at 769.
184.
The auditor will deliver three separate opinions: the traditional opinion on the financial statements,
and two opinions concerning internal controls (one commenting on management’s assertions pursuant to
Section 404(b) and the other detailing the auditor’s own conclusions concerning internal control pursuant to
Auditing Standard No. 2). See AS 2, supra note 168, §§ 207–211.
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notably where a material weakness in internal controls is reported, but an
unqualified opinion on the financial statements is submitted.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the AS 2 obligations in the 1934 Act periodic
reporting requirements ensures that the auditor certifications appear in periodic
communications, and systematically provide valuable information to potential
plaintiffs.185 This aspect is critical in the context of the PSLRA requirements, which
prevents discovery at the pre-trial motion for summary judgment, because the
plaintiff is forced to rely either on public information or on the results of its own
investigations.
C. The Implementation of the Section 404(b) Requirements through Accounting
Standard No. 5
In May 2007, following considerable criticism from the auditing industry, issuers,
and small businesses, based on the Section 404 compliance costs, the PCAOB
approved a new auditing standard to replace AS 2 with Auditing Standard No. 5
(“AS 5”).186 AS 5 accomplishes two main changes which have a significant impact on
the potential liability of auditors.
The first change was the simplification of the Section 404(b) requirements, most
notably by allowing the auditor to focus on the most material areas of internal
controls, rather than an exhaustive testing requirement.187 Therefore, AS 5
eliminates the requirement that the auditor must perform a walk-through for each
significant process before selecting controls to test. This allows the auditor to select
appropriate procedures based on the risk to financial statement assertions. Using
this assessment, the auditor selects the controls to test and the procedures to use
based on the risk of a material weakness.188 One could argue that this may improve
the ignorance defense of the auditor because the auditor may forego an exhaustive
testing process and could argue that some areas of the entity he did not investigate
were the sources of the alleged fraud by plaintiffs. However, this argument will be
ineffective because the burden remains on the auditor to select the areas which are
185.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §103(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §7213(a)(1) (2007). When, on June 17, 2004,
the SEC issued its Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, see supra note 168, this order triggered
the inclusion of the Auditing Standard 2 certification requirements in several SEC rules and forms which
incorporate the certifications in periodic filings (e.g. section 2-02 of Regulation S-X requires the company’s
registered public accounting firm to attest to management’s assessment of internal control over financial
reporting in the annual report).
186.
PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 5: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL
OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2007) [hereinafter
AS5], available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket%20021/2007-06-12_Release_No_2007005A.pdf, effective pursuant to Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5, Exchange Act Release No.
34-56152, 72 Fed. Reg. 42141 (S.E.C. July 27, 2007) [hereinafter AS5 Order], available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/pcaob/2007/34-56152.pdf.
187.
AS 5, supra note 186, §§ 46–47.
188.
Id.; see also AS 5 Order, supra note 186, at 42144.
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appropriate to test any controls which have a material impact on the financial
statements of the issuer. Therefore, the ignorance defense will likely be eliminated
by the affirmative obligation for the auditor to provide a substantially complete
picture of the effectiveness of the internal controls on the basis of materiality.
The second accomplishment of AS 5 is a formal definition endorsed by the
PCAOB and the SEC of the concepts of “material weakness” and “significant
deficiency.” The SEC endorsed a clear definition of “material weakness,” which is
“a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in ICFR [“internal control over
financial reporting”] such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material
misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim financial statements will not be
prevented or detected on a timely basis.”189 This new probability standard
represents a significant change because it only requires a “reasonable possibility,”
which is a higher standard than the previous requirement of a “more than a remote
likelihood.”190 This change will strengthen the auditor’s defense because he will no
longer be required to test every control which may have a small probability of
having a material impact on the material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. In
addition, AS 5 requires management to disclose all “significant deficiencies” to the
audit committee and external auditors.191 Unlike the definition of “material
weakness,” the definition of “significant deficiency” does not specifically include a
likelihood component but instead relies on the sufficient and appropriate judgment
of management in deciding what deficiencies should be reported to the auditors
and the audit committee. Therefore, significant deficiencies are not necessarily
material weaknesses, but are items which require disclosure only to the audit
committee.
Since AS 2, the identification of a “material weakness” by an auditor had
considerable consequences, since its existence requires the auditors to deliver an
adverse control opinion and to disclose this opinion to the financial markets.192
Obviously, such an opinion is stigmatizing and likely to be negatively perceived by

189.
See Amendments to Rules Regarding Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55928, 72 Fed. Reg. 35310, 35313–14 (S.E.C. June 20, 2007). Following
the approval of Auditing Standard No. 5, the SEC has amended Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act and Rule 1-02
of Regulation S-X.
190.
Id.; AS 5, supra note 186, § A7. This definition abandons the “more than a remote likelihood that a
material misstatement of the financials will not be prevented or detected” standard of AS 2. AS 2, supra note
172, § 10 (emphasis added).
191.
See 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(a)(4) (2013) ([whereas a significant deficiency is] “a deficiency, or a
combination of deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material
weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the registrant’s
financial reporting”).
192.
AS 5, supra note 186, at 10.
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investors.193 Even if the stock market ignores the opinion, the one body that cannot
be indifferent to it is the audit committee. Inherently, such an opinion places them
on notice that the entity may not be able to produce accurate and reliable financial
information, in which case significant liability under a duty of care violation theory
could emerge.194 Because adverse opinions will be painful for all, it is predictable
that auditors will seek to avoid rendering them. The simplest route to this end is for
the auditor to decide that an internal control problem or irregularity amounts only
to a “significant deficiency,” but not a “material weakness.” Separating these two
types of weakness is only a matter of degree. According to AS 2, “significant
deficiencies” pose “more than inconsequential” risks for financial statement
reliability, while “material weaknesses” pose “material risks” for financial statement
reliability. Much as the two may sound alike, they require very different responses
from the auditor. “Material weaknesses” must be publicly disclosed and their nature
and impact explained by the auditor, while “significant deficiencies” need only be
brought to the attention of the audit committee.195
Both AS 2 and AS 5 are likely to alter the securities fraud exposure of the auditor:
prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, undetected material weaknesses in internal
controls were not considered a threshold issue sufficient to raise and assign liability
to the auditor.196 Courts generally found that scienter could not be inferred merely
from the fact that the auditor relied on inadequate internal controls.197 This is the
critical judicial assumption which will now be significantly challenged by the
Section 404(b) requirement. First, the AS 5 requirement of an affirmative disclosure
of a “material weakness” will likely limit or defeat ignorance-based defenses by
auditors. Additionally, because a statutory relationship now exists between the
internal control deficiencies and the certification of the financial statements, the

193.
See Helen Shaw, Material-Weakness Reports Skyrocket, CFO.COM (Jul. 18, 2005), http://www.cfo.com/
printable/article.cfm/4193977?origin=archive.html (“A total of 586 companies reported material weaknesses
through early May of this year, compared with 313 for all of 2004, according to shareholder-advisory firm Glass,
Lewis & Co.”).
194.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., SOX Section 404 and Auditing Standard No.2: The New Disclosure Landscape,
available at Westlaw SK017 ALI-ABA 531, 535–37 (2004) (“Obviously, such an opinion is stigmatizing and
likely to be confusing to investors. Even if the stock market ignores the opinion, the one body that cannot be
indifferent to it is the audit committee. Inherently, such an opinion places them on notice that the firm may not
be capable of producing accurate and reliable financial information. If they do not move promptly to correct
any control deficiency, they could be plausibly alleged to have violated their Caremark duty to monitor—at
least if a later financial restatement or scandal arises. In addition, directors who do nothing in this context may
be found not to have acted in ‘good faith’; recent Delaware decisions have tightened the definition of ‘good
faith,’ which is a prerequisite for the availability of Section 102(b)(7)’s charter provision eliminating due care
liability.”).
195.
AS5, supra note 186, at 10.
196.
See infra Part IV.
197.
See infra Part IV; see also infra Appendix 1.
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circuit courts will have to take into account inferences created by the presence of a
material weakness disclosure or by the absence of such a disclosure.198
D. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications on the federal case law.
Following the implementation of AS 5, the question of the legal impact of these new
certifications immediately surfaced in the federal case law. However, the first
decisions which analyzed the impact of these new obligations were limited to cases
involving company insiders not public accounting firms. In addition, as the
frequency of Section 10(b) claims is disproportionately higher than Section 11
claims,199 courts were first confronted with the impact of these new certifications on
their potential value as evidence of scienter in Section 10(b) claims. Courts
recognized that the impact of a failure to meet the new certification obligations on
the legal liability of the corporate insiders was unchartered territory, and recent
decisions show mixed judicial views.
In In re Watchguard, although recognizing that the impact of “a Sarbanes-Oxley
certification has on a Rule 10b-5 claim is a relatively novel question,” the court
refused to find that these certifications represented “a basis for a strong inference of
scienter,” because the certifying Defendants [already] knew about [the] revenue
recognition problems as a result of the accounting controls that they certified were
in existence.”200
In Garfield v. NDC Health,201 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
refused to recognize that scienter would be established in every case where there was
an accounting error or auditing mistake made by a publicly traded company

198.
See Coffee, supra note 194, at 539 (“Traditionally, material weaknesses in internal controls were not
considered material in their own right. Plaintiffs could still assert liability and satisfy their obligation to plead
with particularity if they were able to show that in response to its discovery of material weakness in internal
controls, the auditor failed to expand its substantive audit testing, as ‘generally accepted auditing standards’
required it to do. Similarly, the case law generally found that scienter could not be inferred merely from the fact
that the auditor relied on inadequate internal controls. Rather, some connection needed to be shown between
internal control deficiencies and its audit of the financial statements. If the auditor responded to its recognition
of inadequate internal controls by expanding the scope of its audit testing, it was probably safe.
All this changes after Auditing Standard No. 2. In Section 11 cases involving primary offerings, the plaintiffs
who purchased registered securities need only show a material omission, and the burden would then shift to the
defendant auditor to demonstrate that it satisfied its due diligence defense or that the investors’ loss was not
causally related to the omission. Material weaknesses that once had to be reported only internally now have to
be publicly disclosed. Although such an omission is not per se material, the odds are high that, in the typical
case involving financial irregularities, it will enhance the settlement value of the plaintiffs’ case.”).
199.
See Securities Class Action Settlements 2002: A Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 11 (2003),
http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2002-A-Year-In.
Figure 10 (“Settlements by Nature of Allegations 2002 Settlements”) shows that approximately 7% of cases
which led to a settlement in 2002 involve a section 11 claim, whereas approximately 90% of these cases included
at least one Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.
200.
In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., Master File No. C05-678JLR, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27217, at *29 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 21, 2006).
201.
466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
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because a possible “interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley conflicts with the plain
language of the PSLRA”,202 thereby eviscerating the pleading requirements for
scienter set forth in the PSLRA.”203 However, the Garfield court did recognize that “a
Sarbanes-Oxley certification is. . . probative of scienter if the person signing the
certification was severely reckless in certifying the accuracy of the financial
statements.”204
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon was the most aggressive
in recognizing that “[w]hile any of [the accounting] allegations standing alone
would not necessarily demonstrate scienter,”205 the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications
provided an inference of at least deliberate recklessness, and would “give rise to an
inference of scienter because they provide evidence either that defendants knew
about the [accounting misrepresentations] or, alternatively, knew that the controls
they attested to were inadequate.”206
Therefore, these certifications, “in
combination with plaintiffs’ allegations. . . are sufficient to create a strong inference
of actual knowledge or of deliberate recklessness.”207 Although the Watchguard,
Garfield, and Lattice decisions represent holdings involving corporate insiders, a
similar reasoning may apply to the Section 404(b) certifications by the auditor,
because of the extent of knowledge and understanding such certifications warrant
on the underlying nature of the business, the processes in place with the client to
manage the business, and the ensuing financial statements.208 Consequently, the
rule which seems to emerge from these three cases is a strong indicator of the future
liability of auditors. All three courts agree that a Section 404(b) certification,
standing alone, is not a sufficient condition to establish scienter.209 Also, all three
courts agree that, should plaintiffs show specific allegations of reckless conduct by
corporate insiders, the Section 404(b) certification would be reviewed as additional
indicia of scienter, where it could show defendants “either knew of the book
cooking or knew that their financial controls were inadequate.”210 All three courts
refused to “transform the PSLRA’s requirement of falsity-plus-scienter into a
requirement of falsity-plus-a-Sarbanes-Oxley-certification,”211 and all three
decisions were rendered prior to Tellabs.212
202.
Id. at 1266.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV04-1255-AA, 2006 WL 538756, at *1 (D. Or. Jan.
3, 2006), abrogated by Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F. 981 (9th Cir. 2009).
206.
Id. at *18.
207.
Id.
208.
See supra note 102.
209.
See supra notes 199, 200, and 203.
210.
In re Watchguard Sec. Litig., Master File No. C05-678JLR 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27217, at *33 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 21, 2006).
211.
Id. at *34.
212.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Pre-Tellabs Federal Common Law Standard of Scienter Analysis for the
Auditor.
Even though the legal standard of scienter was subject to various interpretations
amongst the federal circuits after the PSLRA became law, courts did share common
analysis principles to rule on the scienter pleading requirement. An analysis of
sixteen decisions across all circuits between 1999 and 2007 included eight decisions
where courts dismissed the complaint against the auditor and eight decisions where
courts rejected the auditor’s motion to dismiss.213 In all of these decisions common
criteria emerge even though the approaches to the scienter analysis differ because of
the various PSLRA interpretations across the circuit courts.214
First, the level of required recklessness necessary to comply with Ernst & Ernst
must be so strong as to lead to a substantial abandonment of the professional duty
of the auditor: “Recklessness on the part of an independent auditor entails a mental
state so culpable that it ‘approximate[s] an actual intent to aid in the fraud being
perpetrated by the audited company.’”215 In this view, scienter “requires more than a
misapplication of accounting principles. The [plaintiff] must prove that the
accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at all, or
an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or that the
accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”216
Second, at the summary judgment stage, courts consistently impose on the
plaintiff an awareness requirement because “when the standard of recklessness for
an auditor is overlaid with the pleading requirements of the PSLRA, a simple rule
emerges: to allege that an independent accountant or auditor acted with scienter,
the complaint must allege specific facts showing that the deficiencies in the audit

213.
See infra Appendix 1.
214.
See supra note 95.
215.
In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 763 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Decker v. MasseyFerguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982); Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir.
1980) (noting that an auditor’s recklessness “must come closer to being a lesser form of intent [to deceive] than
merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence” (internal quotations omitted))).
216.
PR Diamonds Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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were so severe that they strongly suggest that the auditor must have been aware of
the corporation’s fraud.” 217
Third, federal courts consider the presence of several factors, although they do
not provide any indication as to the minimum number of factors required to meet
the minimum threshold of recklessness or scienter by the auditor. However, courts
will defeat the auditor’s motion to dismiss where most of the following factors are
established: (1) the auditor violated GAAP or GAAS;218 (2) the accounting
irregularities were of significant magnitude, i.e. whether the impact of the
violations, the alleged fraud or of the misstatements or improprieties were
material;219 (3) numerous and significant “red flags,”220 which are “those facts which
come to the attention of an auditor which would place a reasonable auditor on
notice that the audited company was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its
investors;”221 and (4) violation of internal policies or weaknesses in internal controls
known to the auditor.222 On the other hand, courts will dismiss the plaintiff’s

217.
Cardinal Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (quoting PR Diamonds, 364 F.3d at 693); see also Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d at 120–21 (“Assuming for the argument that recklessness on the part of a nonfiduciary accountant will satisfy [the] requirement of scienter, such recklessness must be conduct that is highly
unreasonable, representing an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care. It must, in fact,
approximate an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.” (internal citations
omitted)); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that scienter can be established by
a “showing of shoddy accounting practices amounting at best to a pretended audit, or of grounds supporting a
representation so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief [in] back of it” (internal
citations omitted)).
218.
See In re Hamilton Bankcorp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“In
instances where plaintiffs have pled facts explaining how the standards were recklessly or consciously violated,
however, courts have found them probative.”) (internal citations omitted).
219.
See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 493, 506 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (“[A] number of courts have
recognized that the magnitude of the fraud, while not determinative of scienter, is probative of it.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Cendant Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 589, 608 (D.N.J.
2001) (aside from a violation of GAAP, other circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent can include the
presence of red flags and the magnitude of the alleged fraud).
220.
In securities litigation, “red flags” are “‘specific, highly suspicious’ facts and circumstances available to
the auditor at the time of the audit.” In re Bally Total Fitness Sec. Litig., No. 04-C-3530, 2007 WL 551574, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2007) (citing Riggs Partners, LLC v. Hub Group, Inc., No. 02-C-1188, 2002 WL 31415721, at
*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2002)). “Red flags” are also described as “circumstances that would have put the
defendants on notice that [Cardinal’s] financial statements and press releases contained material misstatements
or omissions, or at least would have given them reasons to question the veracity of the statements.” Cardinal
Health., 426 F. Supp. 2d at 738–39 (citing PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 91 F. App’x. 418, 432 (6th Cir.
2004)).
221.
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing In re Sunterra Corp. Sec.
Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2002)).
222.
See Rent-Way, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“We find that these allegations are of the requisite particularity
and that they, similar to the allegations in In re Ikon, paint a picture of PwC as knowledgeable about the
significant problems in its client’s internal control systems and as having reason to know that these problems
were occurring when it issued its unqualified audit opinions. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiffs’ claims
regarding PwC’s knowledge in this respect are probative of scienter.” (citing In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 622, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
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complaint when few of the above factors are present simultaneously,223 when the
GAAP violations are less egregious in nature and magnitude, where the alleged red
flags would lack significant magnitude or would not rise to the level of a symptom
of a inadequate audit process or are conclusory in nature,224 where the plaintiff’s
claim would constitute no more than second-guessing an audit process which was
accomplished according to proper GAAS procedures,225 or when plaintiff is not
putting forward any indicia that the auditor knew of the accounting misconduct or
improprieties. In these cases, red flags alone, or GAAP violations alone, or secondguessing of auditor calculations or audit procedures are not sufficient.226
B. Impact of the PCAOB Administrative Case Law, Combined with the Section 404(b)
Certification on the Federal Common Law Test
The creation of the PCAOB by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a direct response to the
perceived failure of the system of self-regulation of auditors, which was described as
“a Byzantine structure of accounting disciplinary bodies which generally lack
adequate and assured financial support, clear and undivided responsibility for
discipline, and an effective system of SEC oversight.”227 To implement a system of
independent regulation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided a broad enforcement
mandate to the PCAOB, by vesting the Board with the authority to register public
accounting firms, to define auditing standards for auditing, ethics and
independence, to inspect the largest public accounting firms, to investigate the
firms and associated persons for violations of PCAOB-issued rules, and impose

223.
See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 673 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he discovery of
discrete errors after subjecting an audit to piercing scrutiny post-hoc does not, standing alone, support a finding
of intentional deceit or of recklessness.” (emphasis added) (citing In re Software Toolworks Inc., 50 F.3d 615,
627 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure to follow GAAP,
without more, does not establish scienter”))); see also SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (misapplication of accounting principles by an independent auditor, alone, is insufficient to
establish scienter).
224.
Nappier v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 227 F. Supp. 2d 263, 278 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[S]o-called ‘red
flags,’ which should be deemed to have put a defendant on notice of alleged improprieties, must be closer to
‘smoking guns’ than mere warning signs.”) (citations omitted).
225.
See In re Ikon Office Solutions, 277 F.3d at 673 (“To give rise to section 10(b) liability for fraud, the
mere second-guessing of calculations will not suffice; appellants must show that [the auditor]’s judgment-at the
moment exercised-was sufficiently egregious such that a reasonable accountant reviewing the facts and figures
should have concluded that IKON’s financial statements were misstated and that as a result the public was likely
to be misled.”); cf. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting “fraud by hindsight” allegation
because lack of clairvoyance does not constitute fraud).
226.
See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text.
227.
Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 532 (2002) (statement of Joel Seligman, Dean
& University Professor, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law).
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disciplinary sanctions against both firms and individuals for such violations,
including censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars and fines.228
This new oversight is leading to the formation of a body of administrative case
law which should provide critical guidance to federal courts in modifying the legal
test of scienter for auditors. In eleven enforcement cases decided to-date,229 six of
those involved “intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct that
results in a violation of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or professional
standard.”230
The PCAOB jurisprudence provides an important basis to illustrate its own
threshold for scienter. In all cases, the firm or the professional subject to the
PCOAB enforcement failed to adhere to the GAAP standards,231 and either did not
apply proper professional quality control procedures or failed to apply fraud
detection guidelines.232 Finally, the failure to remedy these violations following
regular inspections, or the repetitive pattern of these violations across many audit

228.
See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private
Status, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 977–78, 983 n.40 (2005); see also Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark,
Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 87 (2007).
229.
Settled Disciplinary Orders, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., http://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/
Decisions/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
230.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act preserves two clear avenues of enforcement for the Board, one which is
similar to either one of the three readings of the Ernst & Ernst scienter standard, of either intentional, knowing
or reckless conduct, and the other, consisting in the much lower threshold of negligent, but repetitive, conduct.
Finally, a violation is not based upon a state of mind analysis, but is based upon an objective violation of any
standard the Board or the SEC implements. Consequently, a technical violation of any of the standards defined
in Auditing Standard 5 for instance, would constitute a “knowing” or “reckless” conduct, leading to the
application of the sanctions under Section 105(c)(4). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §
7215(c)(4)(A)–(G) (2012).
231.
Sanctions under the combined effect of Sections 105(c)(4) and 105(c)(5) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 were applied to a number of cases. In four cases, the PCAOB ordered the registration of the firm revoked,
either temporarily or permanently, and in two cases, the accounting firms were censured. Three professional
accountants were permanently barred and four professional accountants were temporarily barred. See infra
Appendix 2.
232.
As the PCAOB worked to define and adopt new Auditing Standards, it also adopted several preexisting standards created by the AICPA’s Auditing Standard Board. Among those, the Board, through PCAOB
Release No. 2007-001, adopted AU § 316.68, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. PUB. CO.
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2007-001, OBSERVATIONS ON AUDITORS’ IMPLEMENTATION
OF PCAOB STANDARDS RELATING TO AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO FRAUD, at 1, 6 (2007),
available at http://pcaobus.org/Inspections/Documents/2007_01-22_Release_2007-001.pdf. However, in its
release, the Board went further in stepping up the auditor’s responsibility in detecting financial fraud by stating
that the “auditor should, therefore, assess risks and apply procedures directed specifically to the detection of a
material, fraudulent misstatement of the financial statements.” Id. at 2. AU § 316.68 was deleted, but it was
completely incorporated into Auditing Standard No. 14, Appendix C through PCAOB Release No. 2010-004,
effective for audits of fiscal years beginning on or after December 15, 2010. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2010-004, AUDITING STANDARDS RELATED TO THE AUDITOR’S ASSESSMENT OF AND
RESPONSE TO RISK AND RELATED AMENDMENT TO PCAOB STANDARDS, at A10-86 (2010), available at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket%20026/Release_2010-004_Risk_Assessment.pdf.
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assignments usually constitutes an aggravating factor for the PCAOB.233 In
evaluating a claim against a public accounting firm, federal courts are only required
to analyze the scienter requirement in light of both U.S. Supreme Court guidance
and the PSLRA mandate, and are not bound by administrative rules or
interpretation by federal agencies which resolve claims under their delegated
mandate. Additionally, in case of conflicts between a judiciary review of an
administrative rule and an agency interpretation of that rule, the federal courts
would argue that their interpretation would win over the agency views, because the
supremacy clause would enable the courts to subject a PCAOB’s resolution of a
claim against an auditor to judicial review principles.234
However, if challenged in federal court by an auditor claiming that the PCAOB
rule or its application was “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law,”235 the PCAOB could argue that its
stricter interpretation of the scienter rule would resist any judicial challenge from
an auditor claiming he was subject to a more severe scienter standard under the
PCAOB rule than the federal common law rule because the PCAOB enforcement
rule would be a permissible interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, “the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a
detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting

233.
See Armando C. Ibarra, P.C., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2006-009,
at 4–13 (Dec. 19, 2006); Turner Stone & Company, LLP, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB
RELEASE NO. 2006-010, at 9 (Dec. 19, 2006); Clyde Bailey, P.C., PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB
RELEASE NO. 2005-021, at 3–11 (Nov. 22, 2005).
234.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding that the judiciary has the final authority to
“say what the law is”). When different interpretations between the judiciary and the administrative agency are
at-issue, the Administrative Procedure Act reinforces the Marbury holding by evaluating agency action under
the “arbitrary and capricious” review standard. See Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)
(“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.”).
235.
Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A).
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policies.”236 Consequently, it is technically possible for two scienter standards to coexist, a strict scienter standard within the scope of the PCAOB jurisdiction, and a
looser standard for scienter which may very well continue to develop after Tellabs.237
Such a scenario would not be resolved under traditional conflict of laws principles,
as the jurisdiction of the PCAOB is well delineated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the federal courts jurisdiction for Rule 10b-5 claims would be protected by the 1934
Act and its U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, such a situation could
lead to increasingly difficult positions for the judiciary. If the two standards start to
significantly diverge, one could imagine two potential arguments by plaintiffs in
federal courts. First under the Due Process Clause,238 a plaintiff could argue
“reversed arbitrariness” by the federal judiciary because the court, by applying too
restrictive of a scienter requirement compared to the administrative interpretation
of the same standard, abandoned the plaintiff’s interests and violated the interestbalancing doctrine.239
Second, plaintiffs in the civil case against the auditor could rely on the argument
made by Judge Wood in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Makor

236.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). “When a court
reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43. Under the Chevron deference rule, the PCAOB
would easily argue that it adheres to all three prongs of the U.S. Supreme Court analysis: the Sarbanes-Oxley
regulatory scheme as it applies to the PCAOB rules, and its interactions with the 1933 and 1934 Acts, is based on
highly technical and complex accounting rules and standards, such as GAAP and GAAS. The PCAOB rules
regarding auditor standards have relied on professional review, such as the AICPA. The PCAOB accounting
and disciplinary rules balance the interests of compliance with cost considerations, such as the changes brought
by Accounting Standard No. 5 compared to Accounting Standard No. 2. Therefore, the PCAOB is almost
certain to defeat any legal challenge of its disciplinary decisions under the Chevron and APA §706 standards.
237.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328–29 (2007).
238.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
239.
See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest
Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1510 (1975) (“Due process adjudication typically involves two analytically
distinct issues: whether the right to due process is applicable; and, if so, what procedures must be provided.
Resolution of the first issue requires a finding as to whether the governmentally inflicted deprivation in
question intrudes upon a liberty or property interest possessed by the individual. If the deprivation is found to
be of a type which triggers the litigant’s entitlement to due process, a determination must then be made of
which specific procedures are required by the right. Under present doctrine the form of due process depends
upon a utilitarian balancing of the conflicting interests in which the individual’s need for requested procedural
safeguards is weighed against the governmental interest in summary or informal action.”).
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Issues & Rights v. Tellabs,240 when it noticed that too strong of an inference standard
in evaluating scienter could potentially infringe upon plaintiffs’ Seventh
Amendment rights to a jury.241 One could imagine that such an argument would
find new force in the following situation: assume a plaintiff is defeated in its claim
against an auditor in federal court under a less stringent scienter requirement, only
to find out that the PCAOB held the auditor in violation of its Rules,242 had warned
the auditor in many inspections,243 and ultimately disciplined or barred the auditor.
Under this scenario, a Seventh Amendment violation argument may find new force,
by arguing that the combination of the heightened pleading requirement and too
high of a substantial scienter threshold prevented the plaintiff to present a valid case
to a jury. Consequently, the PCAOB scienter standard should serve as persuasive
authority for federal courts to confirm an inference of knowledge on the part of the
auditor from the Section 404(b) certification.

V. SOLUTION
To prevent a continuing and increasing tension between the Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 404(b) requirements, the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA,
and administrative jurisprudence, courts should modify the legal analysis of the
scienter requirement as applied to accountants by using a new approach consistent
with both Tellabs and the PCAOB case law. This new framework244 will rely on a
few assumptions. First, the Section 404(b) requirement will be central to the
analysis because it will determine whether the critical element of knowledge is met.
The knowledge element is critical because the federal case law shows that the
threshold issue is whether the accountant was aware of either a fraud, accounting
improprieties, or of the weakness or absence of the appropriate controls necessary
to detect the fraud or the improprieties. Second, Tellabs requires that, for a
complaint to survive, “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
240.
437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleged scienter as to
statements made by Tellabs executives), rev’d and remanded, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
241.
Id. at 602 (“One might argue that for cases where a juror could conclude that the facts pleaded show
scienter, but that conclusion would not be the most plausible of competing inferences, a Seventh Amendment
problem is presented.” (internal citation omitted)). Justice Ginsburg made sure that the Tellabs Court addressed
that concern, which represented a significant amount of discussion during the oral arguments held on March
28, 2007. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326–27 (2007) (“In our view, the
Seventh Circuit’s concern was undue. A court’s comparative assessment of plausible inferences, while constantly
assuming the plaintiff’s allegations to be true, we think it plain, does not impinge upon the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial.”).
242.
See supra note 225.
243.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(g)(2) (2012). One could imagine the potential
litigation between a plaintiff, an auditor, and the PCAOB, regarding the public release of the inspection reports
during the 12-month interim period, especially if the auditor documented with the PCAOB the reasons why the
report should not be released.
244.
See infra Appendix 3.
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the facts alleged.”245 Consequently, the Tellabs analysis requires an objective
standard to determine whether the scienter requirement has been met. Because this
approach essentially overrules the Second and Third Circuit’s former “motive and
opportunity” approaches, federal courts will have to seek objective factors in
measuring all facets of the scienter analysis, and most specifically with the
knowledge requirement. This element was precisely what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the PCAOB attempted to address by providing for disclosure rules consistent
with the knowledge acquired by the auditor of the issuer’s control processes
through Section 404(b). Therefore, Accounting Standard No. 5, through the
“significant deficiency” and “material weakness” disclosure mechanisms, provides
tools consistent with the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley, and with the practices in line with
PCAOB accounting standards.246
Applying this approach, it is urged that federal courts adopt the following
framework when analyzing the scienter requirement of a claim against a public
accounting firm.247
The first step in the analysis before examining all of the other inferences in the
complaint should focus on the content of the Section 404(b) certification. The
court would first review whether the accounting firm complied with the Section
404(b) disclosure, then which disclosure was made. In the case of a material
weakness disclosure, the defendant auditor will be able to defeat the impact of the
inference of knowledge248 by arguing he complied with his statutory obligation to
affirmatively disclose material weaknesses to the “Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting.”249 This disclosure, which brings significantly negative consequences to
the issuer,250 actually functions as an insurance policy against liability. However, it

245.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
246.
See supra notes 188–89.
247.
This framework would be applied in the third step described in the Tellabs analysis. See Tellabs, 551
U.S. at 323 (“Third, in determining whether the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter, the
court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.”).
248.
But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control
Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449, 1478 (2004) (claiming that the material
weakness disclosure rules under Auditing Standard No. 2 functions as a disincentive to disclosure, due to their
negative consequences).
249.
This is a defined term for the PCAOB. See AS 5, supra note 181, § A5 (2007) (internal control over
financial reporting, includes those policies that: “(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company; (2) Provide
reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the company
are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and (3)
Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or
disposition of the company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements”).
250.
See C. Brune, Study Reveals Impact of Disclosing Weaknesses, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Feb. 2005, at 22
(announcing that, based on a study conducted by A.R.C. Morgan, 62 percent of CEOs from companies which
disclosed weaknesses left within 3 months of the disclosure, and that, in most cases, the disclosure triggers an
investigation by the SEC).

270

Journal of Business & Technology Law

CIRIC (Do Not Delete)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Pierre Ciric
remains to be seen whether plaintiffs could prove that a strong inference of scienter
may be found from the record if the financial statements were the object of an
unqualified opinion and the auditor still issued a material weakness opinion as to
the Internal Control Over Financial Reporting. Then, if the auditor either issued a
significant deficiency or issued an unqualified opinion under Section 404(b), the
court would move to the second step in the analysis.251
In the second step, the court would need objective criteria to determine whether
“the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no audit at
all, an egregious refusal to see the obvious or to investigate the doubtful, or that the
accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts.”252 To
comply with the Tellabs objective analysis requirement and using a unified
approach using prior case law, courts would need to consider several factors in
evaluating the various inferences presented by the plaintiff investor and the
defendant auditor. However, in order to comply with Tellabs, the court will need to
conclude “whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong
inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation,
meets that standard.”253 In addition, when reviewing these factors, the aggregation
of these factors would have to comply with the Tellabs requirement of concluding
that “the inference of scienter must be more than merely ‘reasonable’ or
‘permissible’ — it must be cogent and compelling, thus strong in light of other
explanations.”254 To that end, courts will need the consider the following: (1)
whether the auditor violated GAAP or GAAS;255 (2) whether the GAAP/GAAS
violations were of significant magnitude in the aggregate of all the violations which
were pled in the complaint, i.e. whether the impact of the violations, the alleged
fraud or of the misstatements or improprieties were material, or whether the
violations were not so egregious that their impact was not material;256 (3) whether
the auditor was on notice of the alleged violations, fraudulent accounting, fraud
misstatements or improprieties; (4) whether other red flags were suspicious enough
that an auditor would exercise sufficient due diligence to investigate whether
material misstatements or omissions may exist which would impact the financial
statements;257 (5) whether the alleged red flags that were ignored were of significant
251.
See Acevedo, supra note 53, at 31 n.182 (discussing the issuing of an unqualified opinion, which is the
highest level or assurance that an auditor can give on an organization’s financial statement); supra notes 191–92
and accompanying text. Assuming that only public information would be attached to the complaint, only a
material weakness disclosure would be known to the plaintiff, as the stay on discovery would prevent him from
uncovering the significant deficiency documentation. See 15 U.S.C §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
252.
SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citations omitted).
253.
Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).
254.
Id. at 324.
255.
See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
256.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
257.
See supra note 220–21 and accompanying text.
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magnitude in the aggregate of all the red flags which were pled in the complaint, or
whether these red flags merely constituted inconclusive or circumstantial
violations;258 (6) to what degree the auditor was on notice of those ignored “red
flags” alleged in the complaint, and ignored these “red flags,” and in doing so,
violated PCAOB standards requiring them to exercise due professional care and
professional skepticism in their performance of their audit work, or whether the
auditor was unaware of either their existence or their magnitude; and (7) to what
degree the auditor was aware of violation of internal policies or control procedures.
At this stage, the Section 404(b) certification by the auditor should have been
incorporated in the complaint to strengthen an inference of knowledge and notice
by the auditor. This will require the court to determine whether the Section 404(b)
certification constitutes a strong inference of knowledge of factors (3) through (7),
since the certification to the effectiveness of internal controls over financial
reporting means that the auditor certifies that he had knowledge of the issuer’s
internal controls and if any material shortcomings in these internal controls had
any impact on the veracity of the financial statements.
To comply with the Tellabs objective test requirement, the former analysis of
motive and opportunity would no longer be considered as a relevant factor.259
In the third step where the court would apply these factors to the case at bar, the
court would distinguish three situations in order to apply these factors to either
distinguish or analogize prior case law. The first situation would involve claims
where few of the above factors would be present simultaneously,260 or where the
alleged red flags would lack significant impact or would not rise to the level of
indicia of suspicious accounting practices or improprieties, or would merely
constitute inconclusive or circumstantial violations,261 or where the plaintiff’s claim
would constitute no more than second guessing an audit process which was
accomplished according to proper GAAS procedures.262 In these cases, the Section
404(b) certification and the presence of a notice of significant deficiency or material
weakness would have no impact because the plaintiff would have failed to plead a
strong inference of scienter.263
At the other extreme,264 the plaintiff would have been able to show significant
GAAP and GAAS violations, and that “the magnitude of the misstatements, . . .the
lack of internal controls in [several] problem areas, . . .the number of restatements,

258.
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
259.
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
260.
See infra Appendix 3, Group I.
261.
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
262.
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
263.
At that level of disconnect, the evidence weaknesses probably undercut any primary liability theory
asserted by the plaintiff investor, in which case Central Bank of Denver would apply. See supra notes 111–112
and accompanying text.
264.
See infra Appendix 3, Group III.
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the specific GAAP and GAAS violations” which constituted, in the aggregate “an
extreme departure from standards of ordinary care in a manner that was not
significantly undermined by any purported disclosure by” the auditor.265
Circumstances such as poor auditing processes which prevented the auditor to
honor its “obligation to review and evaluate those records in order to form an
opinion regarding. . . financial statements” or to discover a “lack of documentation
and the fraudulent accounting treatment” may also contribute to a strong inference
of scienter because a proper audit process “would have discovered if it had taken
those steps.”266 In such cases, the Section 404(b) certification combined with the
absence of a notice of significant deficiency or material weakness would essentially
strengthen a strong inference of knowledge by the auditor of the failure in the
control processes that led to fraudulent or improper accounting supporting a fraud.
In such a case, the Section 404(b) certification would be additional support to the
finding of a strong inference of scienter.
Between these two extremes lay a series of cases with specific characteristics.267
Often, a complaint will claim significant GAAP violations by the auditor, along with
a clear disregard of significant “red flags,” such as accounting irregularities
impacting specific business items having a critical impact on the business of the
issuer, and the lack of internal controls associated with these items.268
In these cases, usually because of the PSLRA’s stay on discovery requirement, the
plaintiff’s complaint is unable to allege specific facts pointing to the actual auditor’s
knowledge of the extent of the accounting improprieties, or how intimate the
auditor was with the issuer management controls.269 In these cases, the courts
usually conclude that “it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to state that because a
defendant violated GAAP, the defendant knew or must have known that it was
publishing materially false information. Such a violation, on its own, does not

265.
In re Hamilton Bankcorp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
266.
In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288 (DLC), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10863, at *22
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2003).
267.
See infra Appendix 3, Group II.
268.
See In re Cardinal Health Sec. Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702–09 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (alleging in a
complaint that the scienter requirement was satisfied when the defendants’ ignored numerous “red flags” and
committed GAAP violations); In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(“Plaintiffs contend that they have adequately alleged scienter on the part of Arthur Andersen based on (1) the
magnitude of the GAAP violations by Sunterra; (2) Arthur Andersen’s awareness of the requirement that it
comply with GAAS in conducting its audit; and (3) Arthur Andersen’s alleged disregard of ‘red flags.’”).
269.
See Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1333, 1337 (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to show specific
allegations of knowledge where the plaintiffs alleged “that the Arthur Andersen representative failed to disclose
at the shareholders’ meeting Sunterra’s failure to keep books in accordance with ‘SEC rules [requiring it] to . . .
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to reasonably assure, among other things, that
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with
GAAP’”).
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represent the extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care that the
recklessness standard requires.”270 However,
“if such dereliction of responsibility is accompanied by other ‘red flags’
which the auditor chooses to ignore, there may be enough to establish
scienter. ‘Red flags’ are those facts which come to the attention of an auditor
which would place a reasonable auditor on notice that the audited company
was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its investors. . . Whether
scienter is sufficiently alleged may depend on the scope and severity of the
auditor’s failure to pay heed to ‘red flags.’”271
Hence, in this group of cases, “the heart of the issue as to the adequacy of the claim
pled against [the auditor] concerns whether there were sufficient ‘red flags’ to put
the auditor on notice that [the issuer] was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment
of its shareholders.”272 To resolve this issue, courts clearly struggle to pierce through
the complaint to find out whether the specific facts alleged do raise an inference of
the auditor being on notice of the accounting malfeasance, usually by observing the
type and magnitude of the accounting errors.273 Therefore, courts recognize that,
although GAAP “violations alone are insufficient” to establish a strong inference of
scienter, such “GAAP and GAAS violations accompanied by ignorance of ‘red flags’
could be sufficient to state a claim for securities fraud against an independent
accountant,”274 but in the absence of a stronger inference of knowledge by the
auditor, the other allegations “fall short of tilting the scales in favor of a finding of a
strong inference of severe recklessness.”275
As it relates to the Section 404(b) certification, courts have already understood
its impact on the inference analysis as it relates to the insider defendant who
approves the financial statements. At least one court has held that “a SarbanesOxley certification is only probative of scienter if the person signing the certification
was severely reckless in certifying the accuracy of the financial statements. This
requirement is satisfied if the person signing the certification had reason to know,
or should have suspected, due to the presence of glaring accounting irregularities or
other ‘red flags,’ that the financial statements contained material misstatements or

270.
See id. at 1333 (quoting Malin v. Ivax Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998)).
271.
Id. at 1333–34; see also Van De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899 F. Supp. 731, 735–36 (D. Mass. 1995)
(“A complaint will usually survive a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs have alleged the existence of ‘red flags’
sufficiently attention-grabbing to have alerted a reasonable auditor to the audited company’s shenanigans.”).
272.
Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1334.
273.
See cases cited supra note 218.
274.
See Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., No. 98–6879–CIV–GOLD, 2000 WL 1140306, at *11 (S.D. Fla. July
31, 2000).
275.
In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
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omissions.”276 As the Tellabs court did not specify, there should be no difference in
the scienter analysis between an insider and an auditor, to the extent that an
inference of knowledge can be construed from a Sarbanes-Oxley certification. The
certifications by the insider officers and by the auditor provide that both parties
affirmatively state that they investigated the control process and procedures of the
entity, as well as the effectiveness of the management controls of the entity and they
are therefore comfortable that such controls allow all material aspect of the financial
statements to be accurate. Because both the insider officers277 and the auditors278
certify to these affirmative statements, a similar inference of knowledge will be
drawn by the court. Consequently, in the case of the auditor, the Section 404(b)
certification is likely to “tilt[] the scales in favor of a finding of a strong inference of
severe recklessness.”279
Although the threshold requirements to establish a strong inference of scienter
or recklessness under Tellabs are likely to generate significant litigation in the
future, this analytical framework will help reconcile the impact of the Section
404(b) certification with the PSLRA pleading requirement of scienter.

VI. CONCLUSION
280

Under Tellabs v. Makor, federal circuit courts will need to reconcile their mandate
for strict enforcement of the PSLRA pleading requirements with the critical goal of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of increased disclosure and adherence to enhanced auditing
professional standards. By implementing a consistent approach, which incorporates
the framework of Auditing Standard No.5 and the PCAOB administrative case law,
federal courts will ensure that they properly balance the need to triage frivolous
section 10(b) suits from meritorious securities fraud claims against public
accounting firms. This change will ensure that the federal courts strengthen their
roles as a litigation watchdog, and as the pilot who “has guided the fate of vessels on
the seas,” will possess “the knowledge and skill necessary to navigate through
storms and treacherous waters” of litigation.281

276.
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006).
277.
Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act states that management is required to produce an “internal
control report” as part of each 10K Annual Report, which must attest to “the responsibility of management for
establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting.”
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2012).
278.
Under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, external auditors are required to issue an opinion on
whether effective internal control over financial reporting was maintained in all material respects by
management. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012). This is in addition to the financial statement opinion regarding the
accuracy of the financial statements. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).
279.
Sunterra, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
280.
551 U.S. 308 (2007).
281.
See Robert Edward Guidry, The Seamen Who Have Walked the Plank on Statutory Negligence Remedies:
The Pilot’s Dilemma, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 117, 117 (2002).
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APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF FEDERAL 10(b) CLAIMS CASES
Name

Year

Circuit

Auditor

Scienter Analysis

In Re Hamilton BankCorp Sec Litig2002
Teachers Ret. Of LA v. ACLN (PWC2003

GAAP violations, control weakness, red flags, magnitude, scope
Southern DC oDeloitte
Southern DC oBDO SeidmGAAS violations, no reporting, reckless procedures, conflict of interest

In Re Lernout & Hauspie

Mass

2002

In Re Sunbeam Sec. Litigation
1999
In Re Rent-Way Securities Litigatio2002

KPMG

Revenue recognition, false statements, red flags, misconduct, lack of internal controls
GAAP/GAAS violations, on notice of fraudulent accounting, magnitude, internal controls

Whalen v. Hibernia Foods

2005

Southern FLA Andersen
Western PA PWC
GAAP violations, control, red flags, magnitude
GAAP violations, reckless disregard to risk factors, red flags, on notice of fraudulent
Southern DC oPWC
accounting, motive

In Re Worldcom Securities Litig

2003

Southern Dist Andersen

Arnlund v. Deloitte & Touche

2002

Southern VA Deloitte

In Re Cardinal Health
Garfield v NDC

2006
2006

GAAP violations, magnitude, on notice of fraudulent accounting, absence of controls
Material uncertainty, knowledge of imminent bankruptcy, knowledge of liquidity problems

In Re Polaroid Corp Sec. Litigation2006
In Re Bally Total Fitness Sec Litiga2006

GAAP/GAAS violations, improper practices, red flags BUT no evidence auditor knew or
of misconduct
GAAP/GAAS violations, red flags, BUT SOX not probative.
GAAP violations, material misstatements, red flags, improper accounting practices: (1)
the magnitude of the GAAP violations by Sunterra; (2) Arthur Andersen's awareness of
the requirement that it comply with GAAS in conducting its audit; and (3) Arthur
Andersen's alleged disregard of "red flags," BUT whether there were sufficient "red
flags" to put the auditor on notice that Sunterra was engaged in wrongdoing to the
Central FL
Andersen detriment of its shareholders. NO. Just negligence.
GAAP violations, improper accounting practices, red flags, lack of internal controls BUT
Central FL
Grant Thor circumstancial.
GAAP violations, improper practices, control deficiencies, red flags BUT less egregious
in nature and magnitude (These alleged accounting and reporting problems do not
resemble the pervasive and egregious manipulations found to support a strong
6th
Andersen inference of scienter in other cases)
Refinancing misopinion, lack of thoroughness, but it does not, without more,
Southern DC oKPMG
demonstrate recklessness. No knowledge issue.
Northern DC oE&Y
12 red flags, BUT insufficient.

In Re Ikon Office Solutions

ED PA

In Re SunTerra Corp Sec Litigation2002
In Re Faro Technologies Securitie 2007

PR Diamonds v. Chandler

2004

2002

Southern DC oE&Y
11th
E&Y

E&Y

control weaknesses, red flags BUT mere second-guessing of calculations insuficient
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Auditor Outcome
Net
Claim against
Facts
Outcome
Auditor
Auditor Wins/Loses
Post TellabsChange
Deloitte, Hamilton's Hamilton [**1 MD denied Loses
Loses
BDO International Bde-listing by NMD denied Loses
Loses
KPMG Singapore, B2000 bankrupMD denied (ULoses

Loses

-- it elected not to exrestructuring MD denied
GAAP, red glags, coPlaintiffs' othMD denied

Loses
Loses

Loses
Loses

PwC knew or recklessly disregardMD denied

Loses

Loses

Taken as a wMD denied

Loses

Loses

It is alleged in the Amended CompMD denied

Loses

Loses

violation of §§MD granted Wins
MD granted Wins

Loses
Loses

Loses
Loses

whether there were Chapter 11 baMD granted Wins

Loses

Loses

the existence of scierestatement, MD granted Wins

?

?

?

?

MD granted Wins
Deferred Tax AssetsPolaroid's "acMD granted Wins
unqualified opinions GAAP violatioMD granted Wins

Wins
Wins

Statement overestiaReckless in faMD granted Wins

Wins
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APPENDIX 2: TABLE OF PCAOB ENFORCEMENT CASES
Name

Cite

In the Matter of Willams & Webster
In the Matter of Benson
In the Matter of Clyde Bailey
In the Matter of Armando C. Ibarra, P.C.,
In the Matter of Kenny H. Lee CPA Group
In the Matter of Turner Stone & Company

Year

PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-001 2007
PCAOB Release NO.1 05-2007 -002 2007
PCAOB Release No. 2005-021
2005
PCAOB Release No. 2006-009
2006
PCAOB Release No. 2005-022
2005
PCAOB Release No. 2006-010
2006

Vol. 9, No. 2 2014

Defendant

Facts

Holding

W
Williams, Webester, CPAViolation of § 150.02, Generally Accepted Audit Firm censured, temporary barred
Benson
Audit of Conversion Solution Holdings Corp. IntePerson Barred, registration revoked
Bailey
Audit of Endevco, related parties txs, revenue rePerson Barred, registration revoked
Ibarra
Audit of Triad, 600% overstatement. Audit of Natemporary barred, registration revoked
Lee
Audit of GSL Holdings,
Person Barred, registration revoked
Turner
Audit of 21st century, Bel Air, HCIA
Firm censured, temporary barred
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APPENDIX 3: SUMMARY TABLE OF CASE SEGMENTATION
Inference
Thresholds against the auditor
GROUP I
Circumstancial inferences
Claims: GAAP violations, weak read flags, second guessing
Cases: Bally, Ikon, Polaroid
GROUP II
Stronger than circumstancial inferences without indicia of knowledge
Claims: GAAP Violations, red flags, accounting impropr.
Cases: Sunterra, Garfield, Cardinal
Group III
Strong inferences of scienter with evidence of knowledge
Claims: GAAP Violations, red flags, accounting impropr.,
control weaknesses, magnitude.
Cases: Worldcom, Sunbeam, Hamilton

No Adverse
Opinion

Significant
Deficiency

Material
Weakness

Motion granted

Motion granted

Motion granted

MOTION DENIED
MOTION DENIED
Motion granted
(If magnitude present) (If magnitude present)

MOTION DENIED

MOTION DENIED

Motion granted

Note: Motion granted=Motion to Dismiss the 10(b) claim against Defendant Auditor granted.
Note: MOTION DENIED=Motion to Dismiss the 10(b) claim against Defendant Auditor denied.
Note: italics areas cover cases which would come out differently post-Tellabs under section 404(b), compared to prior to Tellabs.
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